Social Relationships in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Study on United States
Participation in the League of Nations and the United Nations

A Thesis by Schuyler M. Miller

*Submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for a Bachelors of Arts with Honors
in Government and Foreign Affairs*

*University of Virginia Spring 2015*

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my loved-ones, my amazing family, my friends, and my colleagues for your support and willingness to provide feedback on this thesis as I progressed through the project. In my four years as an undergraduate at the University of Virginia, my fellow students and faculty members have taught me and sharpened me. Thank you for making a profound impact. Thank you to the faculty of the Politics Honors program for continuing to challenge me and for affording me opportunities such as this thesis. Additionally, thank you to my Politics Honors classmates. You are the most amazing group of scholars and friends I could ask for.

Most importantly, I am deeply grateful to Professor John Owen for serving as my advisor and providing guidance every step of the way. After I searched for an advisor for months only to find that no one was well matched to my topic, your willingness to help was greatly appreciated.

It has been a pleasure being surrounded by such amazing individuals throughout this project. In light of the pages ahead, I would be remiss if I did not recognize that these personal relationships mattered deeply to the project and to me. Thank you again and God bless.

Table of Contents

**Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review**

**Chapter Two: Theory, Methodology, and Hypothesis**

**Chapter Three: the Wilson Administration and the League of Nations**

**Chapter Four: the Roosevelt Administration and the United Nations**

**Chapter Five: Synthesis, Assessment, and Conclusion**

Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review

*Introduction*

In an increasingly interconnected and globalized world, the emergence of international institutions to link the many actors in inter-state politics is no surprise. Today, international institutions are "explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior."[1] Before the mid-20th century, nation-states worked collaboratively through bilateral or limited multilateral relationships. Some nation-states attempted to pioneer the League of Nations in the early 20th century, but the effort was premature and the organization largely ineffective. However, the post-World War II world brought with it the United Nations and other inter-state institutions to facilitate global affairs; such intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international institutions continue today. The steady maturation of global IGOs has changed the way by which nations interact on the international stage. Today, nation-states are "enmeshed in an array of global governance systems and arrangements."[2] IGOs are a focus of those who study and work in international affairs, including social scientists, politicians, and non-governmental organizations. It is evident, through historical and empirical analysis, that international institutions have become at least meaningful and at most impactful to international relations.

Even in modern international affairs, the motivation for and reason behind nations initiating and joining IGOs remains puzzling. Broadly, scholars espouse competing arguments for why states take diplomatic action. For some, diplomatic outcomes are a

---

[1] Barbara Koremenos,, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The rational design of international institutions." *International organization* 55.04 (2001): 762.

[2] Thomas Hale, David Held, and Kevin Young, *Gridlock: why global cooperation is failing when we need it most*, (Polity, 2013) 33.

result of systemic factors. For others, individual agents facilitate, or stymie, diplomacy.

Social scientists studying this topic wish to understand what factors caused successful

diplomatic engagement in the founding and formations of IGOs. Was it merely political

and economic interests? Was it liberal values? Did advances in institutions enable nation-

states to form and continue these organizations? Or was it a combination of multiple

factors? This investigation will analyze foreign policy decision-making in the

organizational foundings of two similar IGOs: the League of Nations and the United

Nations. The United Nations has proven to be one of the first long-standing global IGO,

but it emerged 25 years after the League of Nations faced scanty international support

and a rocky founding. One of the first attempts at a global peacekeeping organization, the

League teetered and remained mostly ineffective after its formation in 1920.  Conversely,

the United Nations was effectively established by the international community and

continued as an organization after the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

　　　　Most explanations of the diverging paths of these IGOs point to the United States'

commitment or lack thereof. To narrow my research, I will consider the United States'

foreign policy decision-making processes in their diplomatic engagement during the

creation of these international organizations. In the case of League of Nations, the United

States did not participate and pledge support, while in the case of the United Nations, the

United States actively agreed to join and participate. Still today, there are numerous

arguments outlining why the United States was supportive of one and not the other. To

further understand this puzzle, I will explore competing theoretical explanations for

United States foreign policy decision-making and weigh select theories in the case of the

League of Nations and the United Nations. Ultimately, I will assess the role of personal

relationships in the foreign policy of the United States during the formations of these

organizations. I will ultimately seek to measure how much of a role, if at all, relationships

play in determining the United States' willingness, or unwillingness, to participate in

these organizations, and IGOs more broadly.

*The Puzzle*

Over centuries, scholars or practitioners of international affairs have sought to

understand why states behave the way they do. In this vein, this investigation is

concerned with explaining the behavior of one nation, the United States, in the

organizational foundings of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Coming out of

both World War I and World War II, the United States was instrumental in the

multilateral action taken by world powers to coordinate economic relations, manage

conflict, and shape inter-state relations. In both cases, members of the United States

Government participated in diplomatic forums with other nations involved in combatting

post-war problems. Furthermore, foreign policy leaders gathered in conferences to

attempt to establish international institutions to facilitate cooperation and collective

action. Still, a relevant puzzle presents itself: why did the United States Government

choose to not support the League of Nations while the same nation, 25 years later,

actively propelled the United Nations? According to the British Broadcast Network,

"how the League would have worked with American participation remains one of the

great 'what ifs' of modern history… the direction of the system was left in the hands of

states - primarily Britain and France - whose altruism was questionable and whose

economic resources had been crippled by the war."[3] Explaining the United States'

decision-making in the founding of these IGOs seems critical.

Despite President Woodrow Wilson's support of the League of Nations and

President Franklin Roosevelt's leadership in the formation of the United Nations, their

respective governments, as a whole, differed in their decisions. In an address to Congress

on July 10, 1919, Wilson insisted, "that there should be a league of nations to steady the

counsels and maintain the peaceful understandings of the world…had been one of the

agreements accepted from the first as the basis of peace with the central powers."[4]

Nonetheless, in the face of general international support, the United States Congress

rejected the League and abandoned the potential to join in its construction. The

Department of State's Office of the Historian confirms this fact, noting, "despite

Wilson's efforts to gain the domestic support of political leaders and the American

public, he was unable to convince the United States Senate to approve United States

membership in the League.  This was due to strong isolationist sentiment and partisan

conflicts…"[5] The United States would have little to no part in the founding chapter and

continuation of the League of Nations.

In contrast, the United Nations was not only supported, but also a priority, of the

United States Government and the majority of the American public. In 1945, President

Roosevelt and his Executive Branch, like Wilson with the League, led the initiative to

form the United Nations; this time, however, politicians and bureaucrats throughout the

---

[3] Charles Townshend, "The League of Nations and the United Nations." History - World Wars. British Broadcast Corporation, 17 Feb. 2011. Web.
[4] *Address of the President of the United States to the Senate. July 10, 1919.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919.
[5] "The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Oct. 2009. Web.

government were in consensus.  According to United States Department of State records,

"…President Franklin D. Roosevelt determined that U.S. leadership was essential for the

creation of another international organization aimed at preserving peace, and his

administration engaged in international diplomacy in pursuit of that goal."[6] It is puzzling

that in seemingly similar conditions with sustained efforts to establish intergovernmental

institutions, the United States ultimately denied one while embracing another. Political

scientists generally agree that the role played by the United States in these matters was an

important aspect in the trajectory of each organization. This study seeks to understand

what factors contributed to this disparity. Before delving into these questions, it is first

critical to outline the historical context of the formations of each IGO.

*A Brief History: The United States, the League of Nations and the United Nations*

Following World War I, the global powers gathered at Versailles for the Paris

Peace Conference on January 18, 1919. Diplomatic leaders from the victorious nations

worked out the terms of peace in the post-war world. The Office of the Historian at the

United States Department of State notes, "though nearly thirty nations participated, the

representatives of the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Italy became

known as the 'Big Four.'"[7] Foreshadowing the Allied Powers that emerged out of World

War II, these central powers were instrumental in working out the Treaty of Versailles,

which included security agreements, territorial negotiations, and financial punishments

for Germany. Wilson remained at the forefront of these discussions, pushing his Fourteen

Points of foreign policy and striving to get the United States involved in the newly

---

[6] "The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Oct. 2009. Web.
[7] "The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Web.

forming League of Nations. Leaving the Conference in 1919, Wilson returned to the United States intending to convince the government and the American people that the "League Fight" was worth fighting.[8]

Wilson's eagerness for United States participation was undoubtedly premature. British Archives note, "Americans were also uneasy about Wilson's scheme for a League of Nations. They were concerned that belonging to the League would drag the USA into international disputes that were not their concern."[9] After touring the country to convince constituents and state Congressmen, Wilson was unsuccessful in cementing the United States' commitment to the League. United States Congressmen and foreign policy elite across the nation were not supportive. Famously, Massachusetts Senator and Wilson's nemesis Henry Cabot Lodge, along with a larger group of Congressman, opposed the League of Nations and ensured its rejection. In a speech against the League, Lodge contended, "In this draft prepared for a constitution of a league of nations, which is now before the world, there is hardly a clause about the interpretation of which men do not already differ."[10] The United States Government and America broadly was divided over this institution; as a result, the United States elected not to join in the inter-state effort to found and build the League of Nations.

More than 25 years later, the United Nations was chartered in 1945. Created as a global IGO, it was designed to facilitate political and economic cooperation across

---

[8] John Milton Cooper. *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations*, (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
[9] "Background of Reaction to Treaty of Versailles." The Great War. The British National Archives Learning Curve, Web.
[10] "Speech by Henry Cabot Lodge to the Senate Opposing League of Nations." Washington D.C. 28 Feb. 1919. Web.

nations. The founders of the United Nations ambitiously set out to accomplish four main objectives through the organization: "to maintain international peace and security…To develop friendly relations among nations...to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character… [and] to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations." Maintaining the tone of the League of Nations, the United Nations would be a conference, not a federation, meaning that nation-states maintained their sovereignty. However, nations were meant to follow basic obligations, such as complying with international law and upholding human rights in domestic affairs. The United Nations Charter, signed in San Francisco in 1945, was crafted by leading western and eastern powers, including the United States, which united to form the collective body. Just as with the League of Nations, leaders engaged in these discussions in a post-war environment and the principal political powers were at the table. At the time of United Nations' conception, foreign policy-makers espoused the institution's principles of cooperation, humanitarian aid, and multilateral action. Looking back in history to the League of Nations, it is evident that there are many similarities between the organizations and the contexts within which they were being formed. Nonetheless, scholars must grapple with the fact that the United States ultimately distanced itself from the League of Nations that President Wilson dreamed of creating.

The United States was integral in the organizational founding of the United Nations. The founding conference in San Francisco was indicative of the United States' role; the epicenter had shifted from Versailles and Geneva to American territory. Before nations gathered to charter the United Nations, President Roosevelt had worked

internationally and domestically to gain support for the organization. At multiple points

before the end of the war, "Congress overwhelmingly endorsed participation… (and)

Roosevelt also sought to convince the public that an international organization was the

best means to prevent future wars."[11] Despite having passed away before the San

Francisco Conference, Roosevelt (FDR) played a key role in the formation of the United

Nations. In a message to the Heinz Foundation in 2003, the United Nations Secretary

General Kofi Annan said, "we owe the very existence of the United Nations to a great

American President:  Franklin D. Roosevelt."[12] As a result of FDR's leadership, the

United States pioneered the United Nations, held membership on the United Nations

Security Council and was chosen to host the Headquarters of the organization in New

York City. The case of the United Nations is in stark contrast to the United States' role in

and reaction to the creation of the League of Nations.

*Literature Review and Competing Explanations*

In order to fully evaluate the causal explanatory power of personal social

relationships in the outcomes considered, it is critical to place the topic of investigation in

a broader context. To date, the United States' differing role in the League of Nations and

the United Nations has been explained by a multitude of competing causal explanations.

Any explanation should take into account learning that may have occurred in the second

case from the failures of the first. For the purposes of this paper, I will present three

relevant interpretations: 1) the realist argument, which asserts that material and power

interests underlined the United States' decision making, 2) the liberal argument, which

---

[11] United States. Office of the Historian, Department of State. *Formation of the United Nations, 1945*. 1945.
[12] United Nations. Secretary General. *United States, United Nations Need Each Other In Relationship of 'Productive Interdependence'*. *UN.Org*. 21 Oct. 2003.

contends that institutional structure, either of the domestic government or the international organization of interest, can explain the foreign policy outcomes, and 3) the constructivist argument, which maintains that ideational and ideological differences between the two cases explain the divergence in policy. An investigation into the role of personal relationships in this foreign policy puzzle necessitates a careful look at this causal landscape. This section will situate the theory and evaluation of personal relationships in its context.

Broadly, realist theory contends that nation-states behave rationally and seek power as unitary actors on the international stage. Foreign policy decisions are driven by material factors that benefit the national interest. Kenneth Waltz famously outlined neorealist theory, paving the way for most modern realist scholarship. Waltz posited that the anarchical character of the international system would dispose each nation-state to seek maximum power and self-help. For Waltz, altruism and non-material interests were not feasible given the absence of centralized power and decision-making in international affairs. Rather, "to achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy…must rely on the means they can generate…"[13] As a result, a balance of power, either bi-polar or multi-polar, tends to emerge. In all of their foreign policy decisions, Waltz finds nation-states to take action according to this logic. Decisions to participate in and facilitate IGOs, for example, are founded in power dynamics and material interests.

Building upon realist theory, John Mearsheimer famously offered a critique of international institutions, arguing that institutions are reflections of world power

---

[13] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of international politics*, (Waveland Press, 2010) 108.

structures, rather than as products of international affairs. Mearsheimer writes from a position of offensive realism, which elaborates on the power-seeking elements of Waltz's theory. In "The False Promise of Institutions," Mearsheimer contends that intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations are purely manifestations of power dynamics and have minimal influence on state behavior.[14] For example, as a world power, the United States first willed the United Nations to exist, and exercised power through the United Nations to accomplish its objectives. While institutionalists claim that institutions can alter state preferences, Mearsheimer argues that institutions are really just another means by which states, should they have the interest and power, shift and pressure state preferences and action. Echoing this scholarship, Waltz asserted, "state behavior varies more with differences of power than with differences in ideology, in internal structure of property relations, or in governmental form."[15] According to Mearsheimer, states make decisions on whether or not to join institutions based on their material interests.

In *The Twenty Years Crisis*, E.H. Carr completes the realist picture of foreign policy decisions on intergovernmental institutions, describing their origin in power dynamics, not institutional features or ideals. For Carr and realists, the League of Nations fell short of utopian expectations and idealistic goals because of the power dynamics at play and the unwillingness of the United States to commit to an institution assembled by "a miscellaneous group whose only uniting feature was a desire to project their own

---

[14] John J Mearsheimer, "The false promise of international institutions. "*International security* (1994): 5-49.

[15] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of international politics,* (Waveland Press, 2010) 329.

thoughts about the world on to the world itself…"[16] Their perspective, according to Carr, emerged from an ethic of liberal moralism and universalism that proclaimed what should be, not what could be realized in the state of international affairs. Carr believes that power is the real basis of abstract principles like international law and cooperation. Thus, for realists, a careful studying of reality and facts shows that the United States was clearly not supportive of the utopian League. The French thinker Saint-Pierre "'was so confident in the reasonableness of his project [the League of Nations] that he always believed that… the ruling powers could not fail to adopt them"(Carr 27). Nonetheless, power politics dictated the outcome and the United States ultimately did not participate. After World War II, however, realists would argue that the United States had to invest in the United Nations as a way to manage international power dynamics, particularly those between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the United States believed international organizations to fit within its material interests and objectives, it adopted the foreign policy of international cooperation through IGOs.

In contrast to realists, institutionalists view international and domestic institutions as meaningful variables in the international system. For these proponents, institutions in and of themselves can impact decision-making in the international landscape. In his book *After Hegemony,* Robert Keohane argues that international institutions are effective primarily because they lower "transaction costs."[17] Keohane proposes that international institutions are a rational solution to anarchy; in this way, institutionalism attempts to recognize the realist logic while suggesting a most optimistic alternative. Certainly, the

[16] Michael Cox and Edward Hallett Carr, *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) xxi.
[17] Robert O. Keohane, *After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy*, (Princeton University Press) 2005.

international system is ultimately anarchical. No governing power or ordering agent exists. Yet according to Keohane, states band together to form institutional norms and customs in order to reduce uncertainty, lower costs, and improve long-term survivability. These norms and standards act as limiters on states and make future actions more predictable.

Such predictability makes it easier for states to trust, and therefore cooperate, with each other. For small states, there is an obvious advantage in larger states being more predictable, as they are able to avoid dangerous actions of the larger states. However, even for large states, institutional predictability increases efficiency. Keohane thinks that international institutions can decrease transaction costs for all and are therefore valuable. According to this logic, the United States' decision to commit to the United Nations but not the League of Nations was a matter of institutional value. The intuitionalist theory finds that the United States and its foreign policy leaders did not feel that the League of Nations would successfully facilitate international cooperation and national security; in contrast, leaders in the post-World War II era were willing to adopt a system they felt confident would lower transaction costs and enable better collaboration and diplomacy in world affairs.

Robert Putnam offers an alternative theory of institutions that values domestic institutions as significant actors in foreign affairs. Putnam's two-level games theory, outlined in "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," maintains that domestic institutions, such as Congress, limit the foreign policy decisions by actors

such as the President or Secretary of State.[18] Although the Executive of any given nation-state may want to pursue an alliance or aggressive action, the domestic institutions and domestic factors play an important role in whether or not they can do so. The Executive's set of options, titled a win-set, is constrained by what will be approved by institutions at home. Putnam contends, "The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures…"[19]

This logic can clearly be applied to the case of intergovernmental institutions considered in this investigation. Putnam's theory would explain the United States' rejection of the League of Nations and acceptance of the United Nations as a product of the opinions on foreign policy in domestic institutions. The historical account of the United States' early engagement with the League of Nations shows a disagreement between Wilson and the American Congress; Wilson did not pay enough attention to the opinions of those within the domestic institutions and negotiated an unacceptable intergovernmental institution. Although relationships may have been amicable, at the least, perhaps they were not strong enough to provide enough information or interaction. Support of the League was a daring move by Wilson, given the United States' posture of

---

[18] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International organization* 42.03 (1988): 427-460.
[19] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International organization* 42.03 (1988): 434.

isolationism at that point in time.[20] In contrast, FDR was more in tune with domestic

institutions and ensured their support before engaging in the founding of the United

Nations. The United States Department of State reports that FDR actively "worked to

build domestic support for the concept of the United Nations."[21] More developed and

outlined, the United Nations was more palatable to Congressmen, domestic officials, and

even the American public.

The last explanation for the puzzle, constructivism, finds that the United States

made two different decisions concerning the League of Nations and the United Nations

due to the differing distribution of ideas in each case. In *The Social Theory of

International Relations,* constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt delineates a systemic

notion of international affairs that endorses the power of ideas in international outcomes.

Wendt proposes that the international system is, to a significant extent, socially

constructed, and thus, "anarchy is what states make of it."[22] Social processes such as the

distribution of ideas and cultural logic shape the context within which nation-states act.

Although Went recognizes a material reality, he finds that "most attributes we normally

associate with individuals have to do with the social terms of their individual…culturally

constituted."[23]

Wendt outlines different cultural logics within which states have operated:

Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. In Hobbesian systems, enmity arises in an

---

[20] John Milton Cooper,. *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations*, (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
[21] "The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Oct. 2009. Web.
[22] Alexander Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 6.
[23] Alexander Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 42.

environment where states lack knowledge of each other and treat one another as threats. In contrast, the Lockean anarchical logic is one in which states espouse rights and understand each other as sovereign. Lastly, states in the Kantian culture cooperate due to the function of ideas like friendship. If it were not for these varying cultures, we would not see dramatic differences in the international system. In each culture, shared ideas making up norms and institutions make up the meaning of the distribution of power. Ideas, social learning, and internalization calibrate the international system's culture; through this, states can make of anarchy what they wish.

Wendt's theory would understand the diverging fates of the League of Nations and United Nations in terms of ideas and the cultural logic within which states were acting. Post-World War I, the international system was still firmly Lockean, meaning states behaved on their self-interest while still respecting state sovereignty. The United States, for example, did not feel it was appropriate to commit to an international organization that had not been fully developed and did not fit the current state of affairs. A historical look at this time shows that the internationalist movement was not solidified and rather unsatisfactory in the eyes of United States policy-makers. Yet, over the course of the 25 years following the Leagues' founding, the distribution of ideas changed. As Wendt notes, ideas and state identities, by shaping the system, can "move the international system from the law of the jungle toward the rule of law."[24]

With the onset of the Kantian culture, although limited, Wendt alludes to the formation of international institutions like the United Nations and concepts like cosmopolitanism. Wendt would contend that the United Nations was built on the

---

[24] Alexander Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 10.

framework of the League of Nations, but was adopted at a time when such a framework had been improved upon and was more accepted by the international community. The notion that nation-states should follow international norms and pursue international cooperation had emerged within the distribution of ideas in the international system. Adding to this argument, Alastair Iain Johnston contends that intergovernmental socialization processes collectively persuade states to internalize norms of cooperation and interdependence.[25] As nations develop these institutions, they set norms and standards for their own behavior and also establish expectations for nations that enter the institutional network. Johnson summarized sociological approaches to international relations as ones that "treat institutions as environments of social interaction rather than as "boxes" of material constraints."[26] This investigation is very sympathetic to this framework. According to this logic, the institutional socialization that occurred over 25 years and two world wars lead the United States to join the United Nations after rejecting the League of Nations.

*Personal Relationships and Social Networks: The Theoretical Foundation*

This investigation will attempt to assess the role of social networks personal relationships as a causal explanation of our puzzle in light of the current literature on international relations. While the systemic components of the international stage are evidently important, international relations scholarship is noticeably bereft of research that takes actors and their social relationships to have causal weight in foreign policy

---

[25] Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating international institutions as social environments." *International Studies Quarterly* 45.4 (2001): 487-515.
[26] Alastair Iain Johnston, "The social effects of international institutions on domestic (foreign policy) actors." *Locating the proper authorities: the interaction of domestic and international institutions* (2003): 146.

outcomes. A developed understanding of diplomacy necessitates a careful look at both the systems of and the agents within international relations. This investigation does not predict that differences in personal relationships, and factors within them, account entirely for the divergence in United States foreign policy towards the League and the United Nations. Rather, it seeks to understand whether or not they played a meaningful role in the outcome and to some extent shaped the decisions made on intergovernmental affairs and the considered IGOs.

Theories on social networks and personal relationships have long been of interest as causal mechanisms investigated by academics. For example, some sociologists and historians take seriously the impact of relationships, social groups, and social processes on political and social phenomena. In accounts of political behavior and organizational systems, researchers in these fields have found and articulated the importance of personal traits, such as leadership and social relationships, in outcomes. Historians find that relationships between individual actors matter to some extent given their value in historical accounts. Even some political scientists, in the late 20th century began to investigate the role of interpersonal characteristics in foreign policy decision-making.[27] In the discipline of Sociology, social network theory tests social networks as a causal factor in outcomes. In *Complex Social Networks*, Vega-Redondo finds that networks "…build upon some complex (as well as evolving) pattern of bilateral connections among individual entities and the overall performance of the system is largely shaped by the

---

[27] Margaret G Hermann, "Explaining foreign policy behavior using the personal characteristics of political leaders." *International Studies Quarterly* (1980): 7-46.

intricate architecture of those connections."[28] There is a developed sociological literature that takes personal and familial relationships in business to be important drivers in transactions.[29]

These findings, and their methods, rely on a complex and quantitative form of social network theory. In the considered investigation, I will not attempt to examine such a model and undertake a quantitative test of networks in each case. Certainly, there is reason to conduct this work in the future. However, I wish to qualitatively trace the role of relationships and social networks in the United States' engagement with the League of Nations and United Nations. This investigation will look at the strength and weakness of networks and personal relationships in these cases, including factors such as the emotional state of the relationships, trust, information sharing, and the number of networks. It will be critical to evaluate the presence, or absence, of these variables in the case considered. Historical records, biographical accounts, and political research all offer information on these phenomena as the League of Nations and United Nations unfolded. For the sake of rigorous analysis, however, we must consider how these factors stand in light of the alternate explanations outlined in this chapter. This will be completed later in the investigation.

This study's focus on personal relationships draws on three key pieces of political scholarship and theory that point to the potential impact of networks, relationships, and social orders in international affairs. In particular, these texts touch on the role of agents

---

[28] Fernando Vega-Redondo, *Complex social networks*, (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 1.

[29] Brian Uzzi, "The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic performance of organizations: The network effect." *American sociological review* (1996): 674-698.

and actors in decision-making and emerging intergovernmental entities. In an article titled "Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance," Miles Kahler evaluates the role of networks (not necessarily person to person) in international results. Networks are defined as "any set of interconnected nodes…The nodes can be individuals, groups, organizations, or states (as well as cells or Internet users); the connections or links can consist of personal friendships, trade flows, or valued resources."[30] Although Kahler outlines how networks can be understood in terms of structure, this paper will assess networks and relationships in their familiar role as actors and agents. This interpretation assesses networks as collective and often coordinated interactions aimed at impacting outcomes.

I rely on a slightly more specific definition of networks put forth by Joel Podolny and Karen Page:  a network is "any collection of actors (N≥2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange."[31] Within the walls of the United States bureaucracy, networks and relationships exist. The development of strong and weak relationships, through factors such emotional ties or information sharing, may matter. This investigation considers the role of personal networks between political leaders in foreign policy decision-making both inside and outside of the domain of official institutions.

In different ways, scholars Keck and Sikkink and scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter have conducted meaningful research on personal networks. In particular, these authors

---

[30] Miles Kahler, ed. *Networked politics: agency, power, and governance*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009) 5.

[31] Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, "Network forms of organization." *Annual review of sociology* (1998): 59.

have focused on how these networks within and between international organizations have had, or not had, an effect. In their book *Activists Beyond Boarders*, Keck and Sikkink claim that, in the increasingly interconnected world of international organizations, transnational networks have had an influence on foreign policy decisions, such as environmental policy and human rights. From a constructivist perspective, these authors find that non-state actors utilize relationships as mechanisms for emotional ties, information sharing, and trust to navigate the international system and achieve domestic outcomes. According to their research, "The bulk of what networks do might be termed persuasion or socialization, but neither process is devoid of conflict. Persuasion and socialization often involve not just reasoning with opponents, but also bringing pressure, arm-twisting, encouraging sanctions, and shaming."[32] This model of behavior between actors in the international system is illustrative of the phenomenon of networks and the agency of relationships in foreign and domestic policy. While this investigation will only consider in a limited way how non-state actors participated in the League of Nations and the United Nations, it will build upon the theoretical framework proposed by Keck and Sikkink.

In an article titled "The Real New World Order," Anne-Marie Slaughter evaluates Jessica Mathews' assertion that the operation and function of global politics has shifted from a top-down hierarchical structure to a network that connects various international actors and enables them to act collectively. According to this logic "the engine of this transformation is the information technology revolution, a radically expanded communications capacity that empowers individuals and groups while diminishing

---

[32] Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*, (Vol. 6. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) 16.

traditional authority… [such] governance denotes cooperative problem-solving by a changing and often uncertain cast."[33] In this new global order, actors are understood as important agents in the outcomes of international governance. Slaughter clarifies, however, that the "state," as a governing institution, is not growing irrelevant. Instead, she contends that state institutions have formed networks of their own and that the informal ties between political actors at multiple levels have become drivers of the new world order. This research offers a reason to look into the networks and relationships between American actors in foreign policy decision-making regarding the League of Nations and the United Nations. This investigation will not focus on inter-state networks, but rather the intra-state networks and relationships between United States foreign policy leaders during the formation of the League of Nations and the United Nations.

This literature shapes and informs the theory I will test throughout this investigation. As I have discussed, this study will examine social networks and personal relationships as an explanatory variable in the diverging outcome of United States' participation in the League of Nations and the United Nations. Networks and relationships are "bound together by shared values, dense exchanges of information and services, and common discourses…"[34] To further understand foreign policy decision-making, I wish to understand the function of relationships in the diplomatic process. I will analyze the presence or absence of strong and weak social networks and personal relationships between foreign policy leaders within the United States. By looking at the events and relationships throughout the founding of the League of Nations and the United

---

[33] Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The real new world order." *Foreign Affairs* (1997): 183-197.
[34] Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, *Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms*, (U of Minnesota Press, 2002) 7.

Nations, this investigation will test for the impact of these factors on the United States'

differing foreign policy decisions. I hypothesize that the difference in strength of network

and personal relationships involving American actors plays a meaningful role in the

United States' rejection of the League of Nations and commitment to the United Nations.

In Chapter Two, I will elaborate on the theory, methodology, and hypothesis before

conducting each case study.

*The Study: Purpose and Roadmap*

A brief note should be made on the purpose and the plan of this investigation. The

purpose of this investigation is to contribute to the current literature on IGOs, foreign

policy decision-making, and international relations more broadly. While much work has

been done on the role of systemic factors in political outcomes, I find it critical to further

investigate the role of networks and relationships in international affairs. I do not seek to

determine a mono-causal explanation and propose a mono-causal argument for foreign

policy decision-making. Rather, I intend to understand and evaluate the theoretical

argument for social networks and personal relationships as an explanatory variable in the

case of United States' decision to not participate in the League of Nations and commit to

the United Nations.

The plan of the book is as follows: Chapter Two will elaborate on the theory of

social networks and personal relationships, the methodology for the investigation, and the

hypothesis for the United States' foreign policy decision-making concerning

intergovernmental commitments; Chapter Three will feature case study one, which

observes the United States' role in the League of Nations; Chapter Four will present case

study two, which investigates the United States' role in the United Nations; Chapter Five

will synthesize the theory of personal relationships with competing explanations and

argue for the value of personal relationships as a causal variable in these cases.

Chapter Two: Theory, Methodology, and Hypothesis

*Social Networks and Personal Relationships in Institutions*

In order to properly conduct case studies into United States decision-making regarding the League of Nations and United Nations, with special attention to social relationships, it is critical to understand the theoretical framework for social relationships in institutional dynamics. International relations scholarship has developed a large body of research on institutions as systems for good reason. However, the role of human relationships in the outcomes of decision-making in intergovernmental affairs is understudied. As discussed earlier, some political scholars like Keohane, Putnam, and Johnson recognize the value of institutions as connectors of individuals. These systems facilitate better bargaining, trust, and socialization. Ultimately, however, we must not forget that institutions, created by and made up by human beings, are social entities. If one were to ask most individuals who work in government and foreign policy, they will say that personal relationships matter in the political arena. The famous saying, "it is not what you know, its who you know," carries weight for those that work in this field. At the theoretical level, Randall Collins teaches us that macro-situations are a product of micro-situations; we can understand macro patters…by seeing the macro as the dynamics of networks the meshing of chains of local encounters."[35] In this investigation, I wish to understand how micro-level social networks and personal relationships may impact macro-level decisions by and outcomes of the American political institution, at least in the considered cases.

---

[35] Randall Collins, *The sociology of philosophies*, (Harvard University Press, 2009) 21.

A scholar of social networks, Robert Cross contends that networks are important causal mechanisms in political organizations. Networks and relationships enable individuals to shape, and become shaped, within any social group they are a part of. Detailing a speech given to business professionals by President Clinton in 2007, Cross writes:

> "His reflections offered an inside view of the central role that Clinton's network had played throughout his career. They also gave a personal voice to 20 years of research demonstrating that leaders who make targeted investments in relationships outperform those who simply build ever-larger networks, or ignore the importance of connections altogether."[36]

Robert Cross asserts that personal networks rooted in positive emotional ties, frequency of interaction, and trust are crucial to achieving strong outcomes in political dealings. Politicians such as Clinton utilize their social networks during campaigns and in their time in office. Additionally, in any political organization, people making decisions are influenced, to some extent, by their social networks and social surroundings. Psychological research on groups demonstrates that norms established within a group or network, often by a smaller group of leading individuals, impact how the individuals in that group act.[37] Ultimately, as an example, Clinton's social networks and the connections he developed before and throughout his political career impacted his perspective on politics and decision-making.

---

[36] Robert Cross et al, "Leading in a Connected World: How Effective Leaders Drive Results Through Networks." *Organizational dynamics* 38.2 (2009): 95.
[37] Shirley Wang, "Under the Influence: How the Group Changes What We Think." Wall Street Journal. 3 May 2011. Web.

Former Ambassador to Japan John Roos said, "My career was always about working with people, and understanding issues and problems and helping them to solve those issues and problems. How you deal with people - that's what diplomacy is all about. So while I'm not a career diplomat, many of the skills I had seemed to directly translate into the diplomatic arena."[38] Diplomacy and foreign policy are conducted and exercised by people. More broadly, politics is social because it is practiced through social relations. Between the negotiation table, the back-room discussion, or the cocktail party, it seems that foreign policy leaders make decisions based on more than just "the facts." Surely, material reality, institutional dynamics, and ideas have an effect on decisions and institutions, but they may not be the only variables at play. Are foreign policy decision-makers unemotional, completely rational, and isolated from non-mechanistic personal relationships? If so, personal social relationships would be either insignificant or purely mechanistic manifestations of other dynamics. If not, it is worth understanding the causal impact made by these networks in foreign affairs.

Working in a professional setting, politicians and political officials engage in social relationships and environments. Social networks, both formal and informal, have certainly grown as the world has globalized and international institutions have developed. Scholar Randall Collins asserts, "Networks are the pattern of linkage among the micro-situations in which we live; the sociology of networks penetrates deeply into the very shapes of our thought."[39] Within any political organization, foreign policy leaders have an opportunity to engage and connect with each other in formal and informal discussions,

---

[38] Mami Maruko, "Envoy Puts Focus on People-to-people Ties." The Japan Times. 4 Dec. 2012. Web.

[39] Randall Collins, *The sociology of philosophies*, (Harvard University Press, 2009) xviii.

correspondences, and social relationships. This phenomenon opens the door for personal

relationships and social networks to impact foreign policy. Personality and interpersonal

skills, as they relate to relationships and networks, seem to be relevant in political

outcomes. Certainly, many scholars have pointed to personality as a key factor in

domestic and foreign politics. I concede that personality likely has some impact on social

networks and personal relationships. However, it is not the only factor and these

networks and personal relationships include multiple actors with many different

personalities.

Historian John Keegan contended, "Four times in the modern age men have sat

down to reorder the world--at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 after the Thirty Years

War, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars, in Paris in 1919 after

World War I and in San Francisco in 1945 after World War II."[40] I intend to conduct case

studies to explore the role of relationships and social networks between individuals in the

reordering that took place after World War I and World War II. Specifically, I will focus

on relationships between United States foreign policy actors, as I am concerned with the

United States' foreign policy decision in these cases. I will investigate similarities and

differences in the interpersonal relationships and networks of foreign policy actors like

President Wilson and FDR, and how they may have impacted United States foreign

policy outcomes and international affairs. Broader research on social networks and

relationships finds that personal and social connections can influence political and

organizational outcomes. In this investigation, I intend to determine if this is true for

---

[40] John Keegan, "Book Review: 'Paris 1919' by Margaret MacMillan." Washington Post. 15 Dec. 2002. Web.

foreign policy outcomes, at least within the context of the United States' abstention from membership in the League of Nations and creation of the United Nations.

*The Methodology*

In this investigation, I will conduct a qualitative historical analysis grounded in Mill's method of difference. In *A System of Logic,* John Stuart Mill outlines his method:

"If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon."[41]

Mill's method enables a researcher to test if a variable is the cause of a phenomenon by identifying whether or not it differs legitimately across circumstances whose variables, except the variable considered, are approximately similar. The cases of the United States' engagement with the League of Nations and United Nations are roughly analogous and hold constant multiple variables. Obviously, dealing with history and two distinct cases in different times, the homogeneity should not be overstated. However, both cases are approximately alike; each have the same country (the United States), party in power (Progressive Democratic), a setting of victory post-World War, shared power between a "Big Four" nations, a President that strongly prefers joining a global political body, some support in Congress, diminishing isolationist sentiments, international demand for an international organization, and public support.

---

[41] John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive*, (Vol. 1. London: John W. Parker, West Strand, 1843) 454.

Holding all else constant, this investigation will test the variable of social networks and personal relationships to see if it differs legitimately across cases and thereby causes divergence in outcome. Through qualitative historical analysis, I will test whether or not a difference in the variable of social networks and personal relationships had a causal impact on the diverging cases. In the investigation, causal process tracing will carefully engage factual accounts and political interpretations. I will engage both primary ad secondary sources, relying on the work that has already been completed by historians and social scientists. This study seeks to treat fairly the body of established literature on these phenomena and the standing theoretical explanations for the outcomes considered.

*A Deeper Look: Hypothesis*

This section will elaborate on the hypothesis for this investigation. Each case I observe is one in which the Executive sought to achieve the similar objective of joining a global organization. I hypothesize that a difference in strength of network and relationships between American foreign policy actors in two similar scenarios across time periods was a causal factor in the United States' rejection of the League of Nations and the commitment to the United Nations. This hypothesis predicts that the American government under Wilson exemplified weak social relationships and that the American government under FDR had strong social relationships. The null hypothesis is that similarities and/or differences in the strength of networks and personal relationships between Americans had no impact on United States foreign policy decision-making in the case of the League of Nations and United Nations. Below, Figure 1 outlines a causal diagram for the hypothesis.

*Figure 1:*



Should the hypothesis be wrong, I expect to find that either no meaningful social networks and personal relationships are apparent, or if they are, for there to be no difference between cases that explains their divergence. A confirmed hypothesis would indicate, counterfactually, that 1) stronger networks and relationships between American foreign policy-makers post-World War I would have made the United States more likely to support the League of Nations and 2) weaker networks and relationships between American foreign policy-makers post-World War II would have made the United States less likely to support the United Nations.

*Definitions*

To properly test the hypothesis according to the methodology, I must define terms and outline what factors will constitute strong and weak social networks and personal relationships. These terms and factors will be used throughout each case study.

- Social Networks and Personal Relationships: connections between individuals within organization or institutions, based on interpersonal emotional ties, information exchange, and interaction. As I noted in Chapter One, these are

connections "bound together by shared values, dense exchanges of information and services, and common discourses…"[42] Relationships are not limited to personal, non-professional interactions. These case studies will primarily analyze social networks and personal relationships between foreign policy actors in the United States.

- Foreign Policy Actors: foreign policy leaders are United States policy-makers or political elite engaged in shaping and making foreign policy decisions. These individuals can serve in each branch of government or work outside the government in think tanks or NGOs that deal with foreign policy issues. Primarily, this investigation will consider relationships between actors within the Executive Branch and between these actors and actors outside of this branch. This us given that in both cases, the Executive initiated the foreign policy objective to join and commit the United States to an international organization.

*Factors that constitute strong social networks and personal relationships*

In each case study, I will assess the presence of these factors, or proxies, that constitute strong social networks and personal networks. Many of these factors imply strong interpersonal skills. Each of these factors is independently measurable through qualitative historical analysis.

- Positive Emotional Ties: social interactions, comments, or conversations between two or more individuals that demonstrate good social standing and friendship.

---

[42] Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, *Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms*, (U of Minnesota Press, 2002) 7.

- Trust: relationship between two or more individuals built on belief that each individual to be genuine and reliable. According to Robert Solomon and Fernando Flores, "trusting is something that we individually do; it is something we make, we create, we build, we maintain, we sustain with our promises, our commitments, our emotions, and our own sense of integrity."[43]

- High Information Exchange: relational interaction and communication that is filled with substantive sharing of information between two or more actors at a high rate.

- High Frequency of Interaction: a large number of exchanges and face time between two or more individuals in any given institution or organization.

- High Number of Network and Relationships: a large amount of connections and ties between an individual or group to other individuals or groups.

*Factors that constitute weak social networks and personal relationships*

In each case study, I will assess the presence of these factors, or proxies, that constitute weak social networks and personal networks. Many of these factors imply poor interpersonal skills. Each of these factors is independently measurable through qualitative analysis.

- Negative Emotional Ties: social interactions, comments, or conversations between two or more individuals that demonstrate poor social standing, animosity, and enmity.

---

[43] Robert C. Solomon and Fernando Flores, *Building trust: In business, politics, relationships, and life*, (Oxford University Press, 2001) 5.

- Distrust: relationship between two or more individuals built on belief that each individual to be disingenuous and unreliable. This can be caused by betrayal, ideological differences, or personality conflicts.

- Low Information Exchange: scarce and low rates of relational interaction and communication involving sharing of information between two or more actors.

- Low Frequency of Interaction: a low number of exchanges and face time between two or more individuals in any given institution or organization.

- Low Number of Network and Relationships: a small amount of connections and ties between an individual or group to other individuals or groups.

*Challenges*

This study will inevitably encounter challenges of causal proof. How, for example, can we know that social networks and personal relationships in fact really played a causal role, in light of other variables that may explain the political outcomes? Are relationships really the driving force, or merely manifestations of other forces at play? For example, a realist like Kenneth Waltz or John Mearsheimer might contend that relationships are merely manifestations of material interests. For these theorists, it is not the relationships that caused the divergence, but the material interests in each given case. If this assertion is true, social networks and personal relationships are necessary but not sufficient as explanatory variables. Relationships are mechanistic – a causal means for some other variable to accomplish its work. Ultimately, every scholar should accept that social relationships and the ideas and actions that stem from them do not explain everything. However, this study will seek to engage and filter historical evidence to parse out the reality behind these questions; to what extent do relationships matter?

This investigation will deal with questions of agency and structure in the international system. It will ask: to what extent do relationships and networks between actors serve as agents for action? Theories arguing that international outcomes are determined by systemic factors will disagree with an assumption that networks and relationships have agency and impact. A successful hypothesis will require evidence for agency in the scenarios considered in each case study. The case studies will grapple with these issues, trying to understand the exact way in which relationships affect political affairs. Additionally, it is important to avoid tautology when assessing the factors required for social networks and personal relationships to be strong or weak. For example, pointing to cases where there was not distrust or where friends did not seem to trust one another does not prove that trust existed in a relationship. Instead, the historical material in the case study will have to demonstrate that two or more actors engaged in actions that exhibited qualities of trust and elicited belief of trust between the actors.

*Before the Case Studies*

As time passed from the early 1900's to the mid-1900's, social networks and relationships may have changed and general social learning may have occurred. Throughout the case studies of the League of Nations and the United Nations, I will track these factors in United States foreign policy decision-making and determine if there is any difference in the strength of personal networks and relationships. Although the investigation will be qualitative, it will involve gestures to quantitative analysis when referencing the frequency of interaction and sharing or number of social networks and relationships.  In each case study, I will systematically consider each factor and how it may have influenced the outcome of the considered foreign policy decision. Additionally,

in synthesis, I will weigh the role of social networks and personal relationships compared to other causal factors for the discrepancy in United States action outlined by other theoretical frameworks. This project does not wish to prove that social networks and personal relationships between American foreign policy actors are a mono-causal explanation for the United States diverging foreign policy towards these two intergovernmental institutions and differences in foreign policy more generally. Instead, I wish to test a hypothesis that predicts that social networks and relationships are relevant factors in this puzzle. This may be confirmed in the case studies, or the null hypothesis may be correct.

Chapter Three: the Wilson Administration and the League of Nations

*Introduction to Case Study One*

This case study will consider the United States Government's decision to not support and participate in the League of Nations. To narrow the investigation to American foreign policy decision-makers, I will primarily consider the relationship between President Woodrow Wilson, policy-makers in the Executive Branch, legislators, and foreign policy actors, broadly. Following World War I, the international community developed the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference; President Wilson attempted to lead the United States to join the League, but failed to do so. The puzzle is that 25 years later, in similar conditions, the United States made a dramatically different decision to pioneer the United Nations.

I will first tell the story of the League of Nations, reviewing the details throughout the process and considering the implications of various aspects to the causal progression of foreign policy decision-making. Then, I will review my hypothesis and the predictions offered by the theory of social networks and personal relationships. Through this case study, I have found that Wilson had weak social networks and personal relationships. I am confident that the presence of this factor undermined the work of Wilson and his Executive staff and impacted the outcome of the League. I have determined the strength or weakness of social networks and personal relationships through a qualitative historical analysis.

*Before the Paris Peace Conference: Wilson and Progressive Leadership*

Wilson began his Presidential term intending to maintain the American foreign policy doctrine of isolationism in the face of world conflict while also promoting

democracy as much as possible. In 1914, at the onset of World War I, the American

public and its elected officials favored neutrality. Wilson and the American Congress

aligned with this perspective until 1917, when the pressure of War had grown too great

and Congress declared war with Wilson's support. At the war's conclusion, Wilson, his

Administration, and the progressives had an opportunity to shape the international

system. The Paris Peace Conference and Versailles Treaty offered an avenue to pursue

international peace and the ability to charter the League of Nations. Despite criticism

from both sides of the political spectrum, Wilson tried to appeal to "both Democratic

pacific and Republican activist foreign policy approaches."[44] Broadly, Wilson and his

Executive staff were committed to ironing out the League, persuading Congress, and

rallying public support. According the Zara Steiner, "From the beginning the League was

an organization dressed in Wilsonian clothes."[45] Thus, to understand the relationship

between United States Government and the League, it is first important to understand

Wilson, the Progressive Movement, and the context within which these foreign policy

decisions were made. Throughout this investigation, I will then consider the role of

factors such as power dynamics, institutions, and ideas in this relationship.

Following election of 1912, Woodrow Wilson assumed the office of President and

confirmed his role as a leader of the Progressive movement. First popularized by

Theodore FDR and William Howard Taft under the Republican Party, Progressivism was

a political movement dedicated to using technology, economic development, and social

organization to achieve progress and advance the human race. Regarding foreign policy,

---

[44] John Milton Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations*, (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 21.
[45] Zara Steiner, "The League of Nations in Retrospect." (1983): 2.

progressives believed that the government could use these mechanisms to work toward peace, economic cooperation, and better governance. In the early 20th century, as the movement grew and spread between political parties, progressives experienced a good amount of internal tension. With the re-nomination of Taft in 1912, Theodore Roosevelt ran as the leader of an impromptu Progressive Party and Woodrow Wilson was the nominee of the Democratic Party. At that time, Progressives committed to the objectives of the movement were scattered across the political world. Taking the mantle of leadership, "Wilson was something of a mystery to most Progressives; he was a Democrat, and most of them had begun their lives as Theodore Roosevelt Republicans."[46]

In the social network of progressives, Wilson remained a bold but uncertain leader throughout his presidency. He was a remarkable thinker and political leader. Equally so, however, many felt he was a mysterious and polarizing figure. Wilson's Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison notably said, "I was never able to understand Mr. Wilson and with due deference I doubt if you or anybody else can."[47] Wilson and his wife Edith Wilson were raised in rural Virginia and walked a challenging path to the presidency. Wilson received an Ivy League education but the pair did not ascend to prominence from prominent and networks circles. Wilson was not the most socially adept individual and in fact had a very divisive personality. He was often uncompromising to a distasteful extent. From his time as President of Princeton, he made enemies and adversaries in his politics. Wilson vehemently opposed members of the faculty who sought the creation of a graduate residential college. Wilson was known for losing his

---

[46] James Strodes. *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 27.
[47] Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: a personality study*, (Vol. 1144. Courier Corporation, 1964), xx.

temper and burning bridges, most famously with the Dean of the Graduate School Andrew West.[48] Early in his career, Wilson developed a habit of poor relationships management.

This study will also consider the role of Wilson's medical issues in the case considered. According to Edwin Weinstein's research in his text *Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography,* "Woodrow Wilson in his private and public life coped with stresses which few other presidents have encountered. Along with the pressures of war, revolution, and peace-making, he suffered a variety of neurological, medical, and psychologically induced illnesses."[49] Weinstein goes on to note that these conditions impacted Wilson's personality and personal relationships in his political affairs throughout his life. Wilson suffered from medical issues during his political career, including a significant stroke during his tour around the country to promote the League of Nations.

Despite all of this, Wilson offered access to political power and the opportunity to shape public policy in the early 20th century. Coming from the world of academia, Wilson had proven himself as an intellectual giant. The Democratic Party, and Progressive movement at large, was willing to follow him. With the end of the War approaching, Wilson began to fight for the League of Nations and lay the groundwork for its potential creation. At this time, major actors within the American political arena and other foreign policy elite were debating United States foreign policy towards the

---

[48] Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George. *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: a personality study*, (Vol. 1144. Courier Corporation, 1964) 37.
[49] Edwin A. Weinstein, *Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography. Supplementary Volume to The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, (Princeton University Press, 2014) ix.

international system. In 1915, a group of political elite gathered in New York City to

form an American organization called the League to Enforce Peace (LEP), designed to

promote an inter-state body that would facilitate peace.[50] Formally, the organization's

President, Taft, announced the initiative in Philadelphia, noting: "The League to Enforce

Peace is an association organized through the activities of three or four gentlemen who

were first dazed with the defeat of their hopes by the outbreak of the war and who, after

they recovered themselves, thought it was wise to bring together as many interested in the

subject as they could within the cosy limits of the Century Club at dinner."[51] The

organization was composed of leading Republicans, peace-minded Democrats, and third-

party Republicans such as President Taft, Henry Cabot Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt,

Alexander Graham Bell, Harvard President Abbott Lowell, and economist Hamilton

Holt. This group was one of the first to truly consider such a League of states and it was

the LEP not Wilson that first popularized the idea for the League as a course of action

after the war.[52]

Notably, President Woodrow Wilson and his Administration were not originally

connected to this social network and Wilson did not get along with some of its members.

While Wilson had clearly demonstrated his commitment to pursue international peace

and a better world for democracy, his policy was not exactly in line with the LEP. In

particular, he was not willing to involve American power significantly in the enforcement

of peace. More important than any policy differences, Wilson did not like that the LEP

---

[50] John Milton Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations*, (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
[51] William Howard Taft, "Proposal for a League to Enforce Peace: Affirmative, The." *Int'l Conciliation* 3 (1915): 1087.
[52] Ruhl Jacob Bartlett, *The league to enforce peace*, (University of North Carolina Press, 1944).

Miller 45

was proposing actual policy. Wilson wanted to shape the League of Nations policy himself. Eventually acknowledging the value of the LEP, President Wilson agreed to speak at the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace in 1916.[53] After this address, Theodore Marburg noted:

> "President Wilson was the first statesman of the world in office to give official approval for the idea, and from this time he was the leading advocate for the League of Nations. Without the initiative of the head of a state the League idea could not be realized, the head of state is also the head of a political party, and President Wilson's advocacy of the League eventually transferred the project from the realm of non-partisan discussion to the arenas of national and international politics."[54]

Over the course of the next three years, President Wilson and the other foreign policy-makers involved in these endeavors would diverge politically and personally. They would approach the League differently, perhaps to its detriment. Just as with many of his former relationships, Wilson disagreed with how the LEP wished to promote this policy and was unwilling to compromise his convictions. With the United States at war by 1918, Wilson did not want the LEP to develop specific plans for League. In a letter to Colonel House, Wilson characterized the League to Enforce Peace as "butters-in" and "wool-gatherers" that would strive to oppose him with "a discussion now of the

---

[53] Woodrow Wilson. "Address delivered at the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace: "American Principles"," May 27, 1916.

[54] Theodore Marburg, *Development of the League of Nations Idea*. Ed. John Holladay Latané, (Vol. 2. Macmillan, 1932).

constitution of the league of nations."[55] Wilson had also developed an animosity with members of the LEP. Thus, according to John Milton Cooper, "The LEP's strength and effectiveness did not endear the organization to the president. Partisan rancor left over from the 1916 election kept personal relationships cool between Wilson and Taft. Wilson also harbored a dislike for Lowell that evidently went back to their days as fellow university presidents."[56] The extent to which those personal relationships impacted the League going forward will be explored ahead. Ultimately, for policy and personal reasons, Wilson asked the League to back off.

Just before the end of the war, Wilson began to roughly solidify his platform for post-war peace and determine what course he would strive to chart with United States foreign policy going forward. However, the Administration at large was not engaged in this work. As the previous years have shown, Wilson had a rough conception of his policy and was resistant to input from others. Nonetheless, Wilson's closest advisor Colonel Edward House convinced him to commission a committee of academic experts known as "The Inquiry" in December of 1917.[57] Colonel House oversaw the committee and Walter Lippmann led its efforts. Over the course of 1918, this group, made up of around 150 academics working in New York City, prepared reports and information for the President and his staff to be used in post-war peace talks. While the group approached their task seriously, "Historians still differ about how seriously President Wilson, though

---

[55] Wilson to House, March 20, 1918, in Link, ed., *Papers of Wilson* XLVII, 85.

[56] John Milton Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations*, (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 27.

[57] "Wilson's Fourteen Points, 1918." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Web.

a former university president, took this exercise."[58] Wilson was not particularly engaged

in their processes but did use some of their information for the Paris Peace Conference in

1919. Wilson had already formulated and proposed his Fourteen Points to Congress on

January 8th, 1918. In fact, in the last point, Wilson cemented his dedication to the League

of Nations, writing; "A general association of nations must be formed under specific

Covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and

territorial integrity to great and small states alike."[59] Wilson would take these points to

the Paris Peace Conference a year later.

As the war closed, Wilson's foreign policy, including the League, had formed

through a mix of ideas, politics, and relationships. Yet the Wilson Administration was not

cohesive and lacked internal and external connections. Over the course of his two terms

of presidency, Wilson made allies and enemies, both politically and personally. To get

elected and reelected, Wilson had some level of political and interpersonal skill; this

"…proves beyond a doubt that he had the capacity, at least in some circumstances, to be a

versatile political strategist."[60] In some cases, Wilson and his staff were able to garner the

favor of men in order to achieve his aims. Generally, Wilson got along with men that

agreed with him and followed directions without questions. In many cases, however,

Wilson and his staff failed to create relationships and utilize their social networks.

Members of the Progressive movement and Wilson's political following mostly

supported Wilson, but stayed with him reluctantly. One example was Walter Lippmann,

---

[58] Peter Grose, *Continuing the Inquiry: the Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996*, (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996) 1.

[59] Woodrow Wilson. "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points." Washington D.C. 8 Jan. 1918. Avalon Project. Web.

[60] Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: a personality study*, (Vol. 1144. Courier Corporation, 1964) 57.

the famous American political writer and commentator and head of the Inquiry.

Lippmann hesitantly supported Wilson for reelection and beyond, but "it was hard for

him or anyone not in the inner circle of the president's family and aides to have much

affection for the man."[61] At the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson would encounter internal

friction in his Executive branch and would struggle to build and maintain strong relations

with Congressmen and leading foreign policy actors. Coupled with the other challenges

facing the League, including ideological differences and questions of feasibility, this

presented a great roadblock to Wilson's vision that would shape United States foreign

policy towards the League.

*The Paris Peace Conference and the Formation of the League*

In January 1919, after the conclusion of World War I, representatives from the

Allied state came together in Versailles, France for diplomatic peace settlements. Dubbed

the Paris Peace Conference, foreign policy leaders and their staffs sought to work out the

Treaty of Versailles to guide political, economic, and security engagements going

forward. One of the main topics, of course, was the League of Nations, which was the last

objective proposed in Wilson's Fourteen Points. Wilson "used the Fourteen Points as the

basis for negotiating the Treaty of Versailles that ended the war."[62] Much of the work on

the League of Nations occurred between the "Big Four", made up of President Wilson,

French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, British Prime Minister Lloyd George, and

Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando, whose relationships were tenuous in their own

---

[61] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 52.
[62] "Wilson's Fourteen Points, 1918." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Web.

right.[63] The Conference did not include other notable states, like the Soviet Union, and intentionally excluded the defeated powers, such as Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The Treaty discussions were critical to the formation of the Covenant for the League that required approval by the United States Senate. Outside the content of these discussions, the personal relationships between staff and policy-makers were also important as Wilson pursued certain political outcomes and others within the United States Government responded. The Wilson Administration would have to fight for the League of Nations; "Unfortunately for the President, while popular support for the League was still strong, opposition within Congress and the press had begun building even before he had left for Paris."[64] This section will investigate Wilson's trip to Paris, including the substance of the peace talks, Wilson's Executive staff, and relations with the home front. To limit this case study, the section will only consider material relevant to the League of Nations.

Wilson and other Heads of State worked through the details of the Treaty of Versailles to come to an agreement on the composition and function of the League of Nations they wished to create. By the time the Conference had arrived, most European countries and their populaces were supportive or indifferent to the League concept. Europe was exhausted by war and was open to solutions proposed by representatives from the United States. Then entered Woodrow Wilson, who approached foreign affairs with strong progressive political principles and an intolerance of differences, even those

---

[63] Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six months that changed the world*, (Random House, 2007)

[64] "The League of Nations, 1920." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Web.

that were legitimate.[65] Wilson, respected for his intellectual ability and knowledge, used his Draft Covenant for the League to serve as a basis for the formulation of the League of Nations put forward in the Treaty. The Covenant of the League of Nations was outlined, stipulating rules of membership and representation, administrative function including a permanent secretariat, and the location of the League in Geneva, Switzerland. Each article proposed sought to ensure peace and security, first and foremost. Most notably to the nation-states involved, Article VIII demanded arms reduction, Article X required all members to protect any member state if their territorial integrity was violated, and Article XI insisted that all members of the League respond to threats of war. Many other articles obliged nation-states to submit to the arbitration of the League in cases of disagreement that could not be settled by diplomacy and to accept sanctions for crimes of war if such rules were not followed.[66] Congressmen at home and even some of the American staff in Paris did not look favorably upon many of these stipulations.

Wilson kept most of his Administration, with the exception of Colonel House, out of these talks, choosing instead to personally represent the American voice in shaping organization with other European statesman. Although it served as the primary foundation for the League, "the Draft Covenant also expressed Wilson's lone-handed, radically executive approach to foreign policy. Except for airing the First Paris Draft to the American delegation in January, he had shared his innermost thoughts with no one other than Colonel House – whom he continued to use as a minion rather than a real advisor. Wilson ignored pleas from sympathetic Democrats to take them and others into

---

[65] Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six months that changed the world*, (Random House, 2007) 7.
[66] "The Covenant of the League of Nations." The Versailles Treaty. Avalon Project, 28 June 1919. Web.

his confidence."[67] Just as he had before and during the war, Wilson took almost sole

control in the formation of the ideals and function of the League that would later be

proposed.

As a result, the internal dynamics of the Executive staff were tense and personally

unpleasant. Wilson neglected other key members of his staff, including Secretary of State

Robert Lansing and Chief of the Army Tasker Bliss, and barely consulted them. In many

cases, Wilson did not personally favor their advice and perspectives, and even Mrs.

Wilson did not personally like many on Wilson's staff. Over the course of his presidency,

Wilson scarcely used and engaged Secretary Lansing or the United States Department of

State as a political tool to accomplish his objectives. As time passed in Paris, Lansing

became disgruntled with his stay, noting his frustration with Wilson's decisions and

political perspectives in his personal narrative of the Peace Conference.[68] Lansing did not

even agree with Wilson's decision to go to Paris, noting in his diary that Wilson "did not

like what I said. His face assumed that harsh, obstinate expression which indicates

resentment at unacceptable advice. He said nothing but looked volumes."[69] Along with

other members of the staff, Lansing expressed concerns with the League as a collective

security organization and supranational government.

The concerns voiced by Wilson's Executive staff were similar to those held by

some Congressmen and foreign policy elite at home. Wilson was also unwilling to bring

notable Congressmen with him to the Paris Peace Conference. Scholar Margaret

---

[67] John Milton Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations*, (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 54.

[68] Robert. Lansing, *The peace negotiations: a personal narrative*, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company 1921).

[69] Robert Lansing Diary, Nov. 12, 1918 in Link, ed. Papers of Wilson, LIII, 65-66.

McMillian notes, "Even his most partisan supporters had urged him to appoint men such as Taft or the senior Republican senator on the important Committee on Foreign Relations, Henry Cabot Lodge. Wilson refused…"[70] Most obviously, "Wilson didn't offer Lodge a spot on the trip to Paris for the Treaty – this would be an insult to the Senator, the Senate, and the Republican Party."[71] Perhaps inclusion of these members would have yielded a League Covenant more acceptable to Congress and critics at home.

Again in Paris, Wilson did not foster his network of young Progressives and policy-makers. Wilson's relationship with one of his diplomats, William Bullitt, would have public consequences for the League fight. Bullitt, who would later serve as FDR's Ambassador to France, was dedicated to legal internationalism and the League concept. Bullitt came with the Administration to work at the Paris Peace Conference and was assigned to develop relations with Soviet Russia. Midway through the conference, Bullitt resigned. The United States Department of State Office of the Historian reports that Bullitt angrily left the Administration after not convincing Wilson and other Allied commanders to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia's Bolshevik government. However, there is more to the story than policy. By that point in the conference, "the President's relations with House, Bullitt's original patron, had soured greatly."[72] Bullitt shared a personal frustration with Wilson. In a meeting with Secretary Lansing, he "poured out his frustration to his boss and, to his surprise, Lansing confided his own anger at having been left out of the negotiations by Wilson. The secretary also

---

[70] Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six months that changed the world*, (Random House, 2007) 6.
[71] John Milton Cooper, *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations*, (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 34.
[72] "The Bullitt Mission to Soviet Russia, 1919." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Web.

voiced his own deep worries and those of other delegation members that a number of the key points in the Treaty being drafted…were creating obligations which the US could not fulfill."[73] After Bullitt left Wilson's Administration, he released a scathing resignation letter indicting Wilson to the public and would testify regarding his concerns to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The causal implications of these actions will be explored in the next section.

Despite bringing 23 members of the Inquiry on the trip to Paris, these individuals were kept out of the peace talks and relegated to external meetings and functions. According to an article by the Council on Foreign Relations, "To those of the Inquiry, however, and the colleagues they gathered among diplomatic and military officers in Europe, these plenary sessions mattered little. For them the daily teas at the Quai d'Orsay, the bridge games, the breakfast and dinner meetings of experts from a dozen countries gave enduring personal meaning to the peace conference."[74] During their time in Paris and after, these intellectuals remained distant from the Administration and Wilson himself. Coming back from Paris, Colonel House's aide, Whitney Shepardson, chose to leave the Administration to pursue the formation of a Institute of International Affairs that could gather this intellectual energy and channel it into the policy world.

Late, Shepardson and his colleagues worked to resurrect the Council on Foreign Relations, which was originally founded in June 1918 by Republican Elihu Root, a strong opponent of Wilson and his League of Nations. Going forward, "despite growing opposition to Wilson's internationalism, the early Council members supported the

---

[73] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 88.

[74] Peter Grose, *Continuing the Inquiry: the Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996*, (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996) 5.

League of Nations, but not necessarily on Wilson's rationale."[75] These intellectuals

remained separate from Wilson due to what they considered to be his utopian framework

and his commitment to obliging the United States to the League of Nations without

consideration of national interests, power dynamics, and mechanisms of enforcement.

The famous Council on Foreign Relations known today would be founded again on July

29, 1921. It then grew in prominence over the following decades.

At the Paris Peace Conference and afterwards, Wilson clung to the public support

for the League. Just as before the end of the war, the League of Nations remained popular

in the American public. To some extent, Wilson was able to cultivate and manufacture

popular support as he had for World War I.[76] It is no doubt, however, that isolationism

still existed. Certainly, though, it is clear that "The League, as we know, fed off and

promoted popular mobilization. Wilson and Cecil considered public opinion the ultimate

safeguard of collective security..."[77] In light of this, Wilson did not fear that the American

public would reject his plan and cause its ruin. Instead, it would be up to Wilson to

convince the political elite that the League was the right course. According to Historian

Zara Steiner, "It was public assumption that the League could be the world's policeman

and that collective security was an alternative to national rearmament. [*Yet]* The

Government's knew that the League could not assume this role unless it was ready to use

force which only the Member States could supply."[78] By the time the Peace Conference

---

[75] Peter Grose, *Continuing the Inquiry: the Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996*, (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996) 7-8.

[76] David M. Kennedy, *Over here: The first world war and American society*, (Oxford University Press, 2004).

[77] Susan Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations." *The American historical review* 112.4 (2007): 1096.

[78] Zara Steiner, "The League of Nations in Retrospect." (1983): 4

had ended and the Treaty was up for debate on the home front, public opinion was still favorable. A report by Economist Hamilton Holt found that, "In short, nine-tenths of the voters were in favor of ratification in some form and seven-tenths were for a League more virile than the Foreign Relations Committee would have it."[79] It would be the United States Congress, not the American public, which Wilson would have to convince.

*Ratifying the Treaty of Versailles: Congress rejects the League of Nations*

The Paris Peace Conference came to an end in January 1920 and a Treaty had been crafted almost entirely by the Big Four powers. At the same time, the Inaugural General Assembly of the League of Nations gathered. However, despite Wilson's effort, the United States did not have a seat, as Congress had yet to approve the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations within it. Having returned to the United States many times during the Conference, Wilson spent much of 1919 and 1920 attempting to garner support for the League from state legislatures and more importantly, Congressmen that would eventually vote on whether or not to ratify the Treaty in March 1920. According to the Office of the Historian of the United States Department of State, "by the time President Woodrow Wilson returned to the United States in July 1919, U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly favored ratification of the Treaty, including the Covenant of the League of Nations. However, in spite of the fact that 32 state legislatures passed resolutions in favor of the Treaty, the U.S. Senate strongly opposed it."[80] Unfortunately for Wilson and his Administration, his efforts to push the Treaty and the League through Congress were futile. Many times in 1919 and 1920, the United States Senate voted to

---

[79] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 103.

[80] "The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Web.

reject the Treaty of Versailles and offered reservations and amendments. With a final vote on March 19, 1920, the Senate did not ratify the Treaty by seven votes, thus stymieing American participation in the League of Nations and excluding the organization from United States foreign policy.[81] This section will consider how the years leading up to 1920, and the events of 1920, contributed to this political outcome.

The internal divisions and friction within Wilson's Executive team set the stage for the League's rough journey through the domestic channels of American government. As the previous section discussed, Wilson's staff was not entirely supportive of Wilson's Covenant and a number of individuals were jaded due to the events of the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson even had personal issues and a falling out with one of his closest advisors, Colonel House.[82] Bullitt and Lansing, among others, were publicly skeptical of the League of Nations and Wilson's leadership. After resigning from the United States Department of State on May 17, 1919, Bullitt later testified against the League of Nations and the Treaty to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[83] Bullitt was one of many of the young progressives that struggled with Wilson's leadership. Bullitt's testimony appears to have had impact on the League:

"When the president's train arrived in Portland on September 15th, shocking news had reached him. William Bullitt had given testimony before the Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's foreign relations committee. Bullitt had the 'most intense and almost pathological hatred' of Wilson as well as being 'this frustrated young

---

[81] "Senate Defeats Treaty, Vote 49 to 35; Orders It Returned to the President." New York Times 19 Mar. 1920.
[82] Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: a personality study.* (Vol. 1144. Courier Corporation, 1964).
[83] Francis Sempa, "William C. Bullitt: Diplomat and Prophet." American Diplomacy. University of North Carolina, Jan. 2003. Web.

man,' according to Lansing…his testimony almost undid everything Wilson

might have accomplished in his swing westward. It renewed the growing distrust

between Wilson and Lansing…Bullitt's most sensational revelation was

Lansing's hostility to the League of Nations. In six weeks of hearings on the

League Treaty and testimony from sixty witnesses, Bullitt had served Lodge's

purposes best by embarrassing the president. Bullitt maintained that Lansing,

House, Bliss, and White were not enthusiastic…"[84]

In addition to Bullitt, Lansing and others later testified in front of the Senate, voicing

their concerns publically about the League. Wilson had personal issues with many of his

staff and more broadly, the Progressives in the policy world.  As an example, Wilson

continued to have difficult relations with Walter Lippmann, his primary contact in

journalism and media. Lippmann was trying to get information on the League fight from

Wilson, sometimes to a level that frustrated the President. This relationship reflected the

broader relational issues, as "It seems Wilson had never really trusted Lippmann all that

much in the first place; he may have relied on the young man's brilliance with words and

thoughts, but he also resented him and most of the other young Progressive (read: Jewish)

intellectuals who had pushed into government."[85] Wilson lacked internal support in his

Administration and across government as he sought to secure the United States'

participation in the League of Nations.

　　　With the tenuous struggle for the League ongoing within his Executive staff and

Congress, Wilson embarked on a tour across the country in 1919; "Frustrated, but

---

[84] Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani, *The first Cold War: the legacy of Woodrow Wilson in US-Soviet relations*, (University of Missouri Press, 2002), 188.
[85] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 81.

obsessive about protecting the purity of his League Covenant, Wilson decided that he must go over the heads of the politicians and 'take the issue to the people.'"[86] His purpose was to prove popular and state support for the League, and by extension, force Congressmen to vote to ratify the Treaty. In September 1919, "President Wilson headed out on his speaking tour against his doctors' wishes and the advice of some of his political advisers to try to win public support for the treaty and thus pressure senators to approve it."[87] Wilson was able to engage with local and state governments and constituencies, pushing the League as the right course of action for America going forward. The trip proved to be quite stressful for Wilson and demanding on his time. While he was able to engage with some relevant politicians and constituents, Wilson's health limited his mission; "Exhausted and worn out from his arduous journey, the President collapsed in Pueblo, Colorado, on September 25. He cut his tour short and headed back to Washington."[88] His collapse came just after a series of testimonies and political deviations by Wilson "followers" including Bullitt and Lippmann. Wilson was losing control; "For Wilson, who was in the middle of the exhausting eight-thousand-mile speaking tour across the nation to rally support for the Treaty, both men had stabbed him in the back; that he ultimately collapsed on the trip and later suffered a stroke merely added to the public image of betrayal he had suffered from his own aides."[89] Although

---

[86] Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the UN*, (Yale University Press, 2000) 5.
[87] "Wilson Embarks on League of Nations Tour–September 3, 1919."American President: A Reference Resource. The Miller Center, Web.
[88] "Wilson Embarks on League of Nations Tour–September 3, 1919."American President: A Reference Resource. The Miller Center, Web.
[89] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 89.

Wilson had steady public support, the trip was insignificant and illustrated Wilson's misguided approach to winning the League fight.

Ultimately, Wilson and his Administration's fight for the League of Nations ended with the United States Senate. Many Senators expressed reservations about the Treaty and the League, voting to not ratify it multiple times in 1919 and 1920; Wilson did not compromise on crucial points such as Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Concerned with collective security, opponents within the Senate argued that Article X "ceded the war powers of the U.S. Government to the League's Council. The opposition came from two groups: the "Irreconcilables," who refused to join the League of Nations under any circumstances, and "Reservationists," led by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Henry Cabot Lodge, who wanted amendments made before they would ratify the Treaty."[90] These two groups were not pleased with Wilson's foreign policy decisions and undoubtedly pushed back for political, ideological, material and perhaps personal reasons.

E.H. Carr contended, "The Covenant possessed the virtue of several theoretical imperfections."[91] League critics were either concerned that the it would be too weak, meaning that it would not be followed, or that it would be too strong, meaning that America would sacrifice its sovereignty and submit to a world super-state. Responding to Article X, elder Republican leader Elihu Root noted, "If we agree to this article, it is extremely probable that we shall be unable to keep our agreement…The people of the United States certainly will not be willing ten years or twenty years hence to send their

---

[90] "The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Web.

[91] Michael Cox and Edward Hallett Carr. *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 30.

young men to distant parts of the world to fight for causes in which they may not believe or in which they have little or no interest…"[92] Root expressed a realist doubt that the League would actually enforce and manage international relations. On the other side of the debate, those that favored the League were not entirely sure it was worthy enough to sacrifice sovereignty. Testimonies by Lansing, for example, illustrated this doubt.

Nonetheless, Wilson was unwilling to compromise and work with his critics on a League that would be acceptable to all. Instead, he gave them more reason to doubt his leadership and reject his League. Wilson was notorious for not compromising on his principles, much to the dismay of others; a French ambassador in Washington thought Wilson was "a man who, had he lived a couple of centuries ago, would have been the greatest tyrant in the world, because he does not seem to have the slightest conception that he can ever be wrong."[93] After recovering from his collapse on the tour across the country, Wilson met with Senator Hitchcock on November 18th, 1919 to discuss the status of the League in the Senate. Hitchcock tried to reason with Wilson, informing Wilson "that a vote on the League treaty was imminent, and defeat unavoidable without compromise…all of the prominent men who had been with the President in Paris-- Herbert Hoover, Bernard Baruch, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, even his closest political adviser, Colonel Edward Mandell House--were for acceptance of the Lodge reservations."[94] Still, Wilson did not listen. Wilson received multiple letters from the

---

[92] U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record,* Sixty-sixth Congress, Second Session, 4599.
[93] Villiar, Baker papers, Group 1, 226.
[94] Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the UN*, (Yale University Press, 2000) 6.

public pleading for him to compromise, but they did not reach him because Edith Wilson wanted him to focus on his stress.[95]

Wilson already made enemies in Congress after choosing to exclude Congressmen from the peace talks in Paris and generally leave the Republicans out of the League planning. Then, returning from the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson continued to fail to navigate relationship with Congress and Congressmen effectively. According to the University of Virginia's Miller Center, "The most damning opposition to the treaty, however, came from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge despised Wilson's idealism and attacked Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant."[96] Over the course of Wilson's fight for the League, Lodge had been an obstacle to his pursuits. Much of Lodge's disagreements with the League stemmed from "…his overwhelming concern for the two institutions that he served so long and so well, the Republican Party and the Senate."[97] As noted earlier, Lodge personally disliked Wilson and as the years passed, "the senator became increasingly suspicious of the president's motives and intolerant of his contradictions, of what he perceived as Wilson's lack of generous emotions, his entire subjection to his personal animosities."[98] Wilson and Lodge's tense relationship started with their first exchange, when Lodge, the editor of a journal *The International Review*, rejected an

---

[95] Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the UN*, (Yale University Press, 2000) 6.

[96] "Wilson Embarks on League of Nations Tour–September 3, 1919."American President: A Reference Resource. The Miller Center, Web.

[97] David Mervin, "Henry Cabot Lodge and the League of Nations." *Journal of American Studies* 4.02 (1971): 201-214.

[98] Phyllis Lee Levin, *Edith and Woodrow: The Wilson White House*, (Simon and Schuster, 2002) 270.

article submitted by Wilson.[99] Despite these personal conflicts, Lodge was not entirely

opposed to the League and merely sought a few alterations to the proposed Covenant. In

fact, Lodge was originally part of the League to Enforce Peace.

Still, Wilson damaged any chance he may have had with Lodge and Senators

opposed to the League by treating them poorly personally and politically. Upon returning

from Paris, Wilson had ignored Lodge's request to discuss the League of Nations with

the Senate first before public events. Even Wilson's advisors understood the importance

of the Lodge relationship; "[Colonel] House had urged the president to utilize courtesy

and tact by reserving a defense of the Covenant for the congressional foreign relations

committees. Instead, after landing to a tumultuous reception in Boston, Senator Lodge's

own domain, Wilson made a fighting speech in defense of his handiwork"[100] Lodge

reacted coldly to this decision and continued to challenge Wilson and his League.

Leading the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he sought testimonies against the

President and his plan to further prove his position on the matter. Reflecting on his

opposition, Wilson stated that, in his opinion, "a group of men in the Senate have

deliberately chosen to embarrass the administration of the Government."[101] Wilson did

attempt to rally support through some senators, like Senator Gilbert Hitchcock from

Nebraska. Although they had previously had a less than friendly political relationship,

Hitchcock's support of the League gave Wilson an ally to work with in Congress.[102] Yet,

---

[99] Phyllis Lee Levin, *Edith and Woodrow: The Wilson White House*, (Simon and Schuster, 2002) 271.

[100] Norman Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference*, (Vol. 84. Heath, 1972) 18.

[101] Wilson statement, March 4, 1919, in Link, ed., Papers of Wilson, LV 408-409.

[102] Kurt Wimer, "Senator Hitchcock and the League of Nations," Nebraska History 44 (1963): 189-204

nonetheless, Wilson clearly felt at odds with his fellow politicians. Evidently, Lodge encompassed this animosity in the closing of one of his many remarks on the League of Nations;  "The senator concluded…with a slur on the intelligence of some of the framers—clearly intended, it would seem, to infuriate the sensitive president."[103]

By the time March 1920 arrived, the Wilson Administration was still not able to convince the Senate to support the Treaty and the League. On March 19, 1920, the Treaty of Versailles fell just 7 votes short of ratification by the Senate. With such a close vote between the two sides, the margins appear to have mattered. Certainly, the debate was grounded in ideological differences and material interests. There was a good amount of support of the League concept. As a result, "…we must bury the idea that the Treaty's defeat represented the resurgence of American isolationism. The vast majority of Senators supported the League in one form or another. So, too, did other organs of public opinion. Certainly most Americans and their representatives favored at least an amended League."[104] In this light, Wilson had an opportunity to facilitate a better relationship with Congressmen, which may have changed the political outcome and the United States ultimate rejection of the League of Nations.  Having failed to pass the Treaty, Wilson let down many within the Progressive movement and the Democratic Party; "Despite their initial hope, Democrats were soon convinced that the Republican administration 'had transferred much of their hatred for Wilson to the institutions of which he was the chief founder'."[105]

---

[103] Norman Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference*, (Vol. 84. Heath, 1972) 19.
[104] Zara Steiner, "The League of Nations in Retrospect." (1983): 129
[105] Warren F Kuehl, *Keeping the covenant: American internationalists and the League of Nations, 1920-1939*, (Kent State University Press, 1997) 34.

*Assessing the Hypothesis*

In this case study, I have conducted a qualitative historical review of process by which the United States Government wrestled with the notion of the League of Nations and ultimately did not join. Many scholars understand this political outcome to be caused by factors such as ideological disagreements, institutional arrangements, and power distributions. However, consistent with my hypothesis, I have found that weak personal relationships and social networks between Wilson and foreign policy actors played a causal role in the process and later in its differentiation from the United Nations. Wilson's inability to navigate personal relationships and harness social networks contributed to the decision by the United States Senate to not ratify the Treaty of Versailles. It was not just Wilson's personality that led to failure of the League; weak personal relationships and social networks within the Executive branch and between the Wilson-led Executive, Congress, and foreign policy actors ensured a hostile environment within which the League of Nations would fail.

Building on the case study in the sections before, this section will note whether or not this case satisfies the factors of "weak" social networks and personal relationships, as outlined in Chapter Two. In some cases, the case may deviate from my hypothesis, either by containing strong relationships or relationships that are insignificant as causal variables. While this section will review the case of the Wilson Administration and the League of Nations, it will not seek to fully explain how divergences in social networks and personal relationships may account for the puzzle of differing United States foreign policy towards the League and the United Nations. I will consider these questions in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.

*Negative Emotional Ties*

According to the theory, negative emotional ties are defined as social interactions, comments, or conversations between two or more individuals that demonstrate poor social standing, animosity, and enmity. The case study demonstrated mostly negative emotional ties between Wilson and his Executive staff and the Wilson Administration and Congressmen. There is certain evidence that those around Wilson had a respect for his intellectual and political genius. However, many on his Executive staff, like House, Lansing, and Bullitt, did not view Wilson fondly at a personal level and felt neglected politically. For example, "…after considering the facts of the House-Wilson relationship, [it is easy to] conclude that it is yet another manifestation of Wilson's 'enigmatic' and complex personality."[106] This personality, unapproachable to many, did not illicit positive emotions. Wilson's staff had very little affection for the President and often expressed their disdain and enmity multiple times throughout the League fight. Wilson reluctantly included some of his Executive officials in the League fight; for example, he believed that Secretary Lansing "was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet…That he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability."[107] There was even tension between Mrs. Wilson and some of the staff, particularly at the Paris Peace Conference.[108]

More apparently, Wilson did not have positive relations with a select group of Congressmen, most importantly Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge and Wilson maintained a

---

[106] Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: a personality study*, (Vol. 1144. Courier Corporation, 1964) xix.
[107] Woodrow Wilson, Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 482-83, 497-98.
[108] Norman Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference*, (Vol. 84. Heath, 1972).

mutual hatred and did everything they could in their fight against each other. This relationship was important to the League fight and reflected deeply negative emotional ties. Even in other relationships along the way, with members of the LEP, the Inquiry, and other foreign policy actors, Wilson maintained emotional distance and often upset those he worked with. MacMillan notes, "Wilson' career was a series of triumphs, but there were darker moments, both personal and political…he had left behind him a trail of enemies, many of them former friends."[109]

*Distrust*

Distrust within social networks and personal relationships is constituted by a belief by one or parties that the other individual to be disingenuous and unreliable. There appears to be a small amount of distrust in the case of Wilson and his fight for the League of Nations. Although Wilson tried to amass support for the League, he largely kept the Covenant and the plans to himself and was unwilling to trust many around him. He did not even trust his advisors and staff to participate effectively and reliably in the peace talks. Wilson continued to foster a relationship with Walter Lippmann but believed that "he is one of the most slippery and untrustworthy of the men we have had to deal with…"[110] Wilson's unwillingness to trust those he worked with led some, like Bullitt and Lansing, to betray his trust and speak against him. This distrust negated any chance of Wilson using Lansing and the United States Department of State to complete necessary work on the League of Nations. Additionally, Mrs. Wilson exacerbated this distrust and worked to break up the relationship between House and Wilson in late 1919.

---

[109] Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six months that changed the world*, (Random House, 2007) 5.

[110] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 81.

After Wilson's stroke, Edith Wilson took many responsibilities into her own hands. After Secretary of State Lansing hosted Cabinet meetings without the President against the First Lady's will, Edith Wilson deemed this an act of disloyalty and convinced the President to dismiss Lansing. Wilson requested his resignation in February 1920.[111]

Lastly, Wilson lacked trust in Congress, and in particular, Congressional republicans. According to Margret Macmillan, the real reason Wilson did not include Congressional Republicans in the Paris Peace Conference "was that he did not like or trust Republicans. His decision was costly, because it undercut his position in Paris and damaged his dream of a new world order with the United States at its heart."[112] In his fight for the League, Wilson treated a number of other actors with a lack of trust that undermined his political clout and credibility.

*Low Information Exchange and Frequency of Interaction*

Social networks and personal relationships marked with little information exchange have low rates of relational interaction and communication involving sharing of information between two or more actors. Additionally, low frequency of interaction is present when there are a low number of exchanges and little face time between two or more individuals in any given institution or organization. Just as the discussion of previous factor noted, Wilson kept his distance from many of his advisors and political colleagues. Especially concerning the formation of the League Covenant and the Treaty of Versailles more generally, information exchange and interaction between Wilson and others inside and outside his Administration was low. For example, Wilson kept his main

---

[111] "First Lady Biography: Edith Wilson." Firstladies.org. National First Ladies' Library and Historic Site, Web.

[112] Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six months that changed the world*, (Random House, 2007) 6.

commissioners and advisors out of many of the diplomatic sessions at the Paris Peace Conference, including those about the League. Although it is speculation:

"This was probably unfortunate for, apart from the unnecessary humiliation of three able men, their talents could have been used to advantage the framing of a more tightly written document. Furthermore, some of the objections to the charter held by the three were also current in America and alteration of the League to meet their views might well have enhanced its chances for approval in the Senate."[113]

Perhaps, with more information sharing, the Covenant would have been different. Wilson did not share the Draft Covenant with many before the Paris Peace Conference and often chose to speak publically about the League rather than meet with political elite to discuss it.

Wilson and his Administration could have included and consulted many more individuals on the League of Nations and been willing to share information with them. As the LEP was striving to have a seat at the table, Wilson hesitantly developed a relationship with their leadership and eventually dismissed them. Additionally, Wilson only attempted to meet with the Senators directly a few times, most notably on August 19th, 1919 for his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. After taking Lodge and fifteen committee members in the East Room of the White House, "Lodge writes that the President 'took the questioning, which was rather sharp at times, in good part, although at the end . . . he seemed very much fatigued.'"[114] After going on his trip

---

[113] Norman Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference*, (Vol. 84. Heath, 1972) 14.
[114] "The Senate and the League of Nations." The United States Senate. Web.

across the country, distracting from his time in Washington, he wasn't even able to finish

due to health issues. No political momentum was gained. Throughout the formation of

the League, few from the Wilson Administration consulted Congressmen and developed

personal relationships with lawmakers. Ultimately, Wilson limited his sharing about and

engagement with others on the League of Nations.

*Low Number of Networks and Relationships*

In this case, there were only a small number of connections and ties between the

Wilson Administration and other individuals or groups. Wilson did not do well to engage

his networks and relationships as he formulated the League of Nations for his Fourteen

Points, prepare the Covenant of the League of Nations, and get the Treaty of Versailles

passed through the Senate. Throughout his career, Wilson "was keenly aware of the

tendency for men of affairs to look with scorn upon ivory tower academicians."[115] As the

idea of the League of Nations was developing before the end of the war, Wilson ensured

that the plans for the League were kept to himself. He barely fostered a relationship with

the LEP. Wilson scarcely tapped into "the Inquiry," the group he began to inform him for

the Paris Peace Conference. This was merely an example of his lack of engagement with

foreign policy elite. He made some visits with constituents and state politicians in 1919

and 1920, but none with individuals particularly relevant to the fight with Congress.

Wilson failed to engage networks within Congress often. At this point, "The

internationalists remained such a divided community…"[116] Wilson failed to relate to

---

[115] Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: a personality study*, (Vol. 1144. Courier Corporation, 1964) 29.
[116] Warren F. Kuehl, *Keeping the covenant: American internationalists and the League of Nations, 1920-1939*, (Kent State University Press, 1997) xvi.

these different communities and unite them in their efforts. Instead, he chose to fight the battle for the League alone. In the end, he failed to win.

*Alternative Explanations*

Throughout the case study, I have considered how other factors, such as material interests, institutions, and ideas, may have explained certain results along the way and the political outcome for United States participation in the League of Nations. This chapter has sought to include these factors in the discussion to better understand how relationships did and did not impact this case. Each factor appears to have a meaningful role in the United States' failure to join the League of Nations. Material interests in preserving United States power and national security seem to have led congressmen and political elite to doubt the obligations put forward by the League and the utility of its services. Under institutional theory, the failure to commit can be explained by the inadequacies of the League as an institution and the unwillingness of domestic institutions to accept the endeavor, for whatever reasons. Lastly, ideological differences between parties and foreign policy elites regarding international participation seem to play a role in these outcomes. After the case study on the United Nations, I will weigh each explanation alongside social networks and personal relationships as causal factors in the divergence of foreign policy towards the League of Nations and United Nations. Chapter Five will engage this material, synthesizing competing explanations and attempting to piece together a satisfactory and comprehensive understanding of this puzzle of United States foreign policy decision-making.

*Conclusion*

At this point, I have found a large amount of evidence that is consistent with my theory and hypothesis. These findings indicate that poor personal relationships and social networks had a role in this international affairs outcome and perhaps in a divergence 25 years later. The second case study will provide an opportunity to investigate if strong personal relationships and social networks had a role in the United States' leadership of and commitment to the United Nations. Should this be the case, this variable can help scholars understand the divergence in United States foreign policy between these two somewhat similar cases. It would then stand alongside realism, institutionalism, and constructivism as another theoretical framework for understanding and explaining foreign policy outcomes and their causes.

Chapter Four: The Roosevelt Administration and the United Nations

*Introduction to Case Study Two*

In 1945, several years after the failure of the United States to join and support the

League of Nations, representatives from the United States Government hosted

governments from around the world at the San Francisco Conference to charter the

United Nations. It is puzzling that, despite similar circumstances in a post-war world, the

United States opposed the League of Nations, but actively led in the creation of the

United Nations. Building on case study one, the purpose of this case study is to

investigate the United States' commitment to the United Nations and to understand what

role, if any, social networks and personal relationships played in this result. To do so, I

will conduct a quantitative historical review and analysis of the years leading up to the

United States' formal commitment to the United Nations.

Like case study one, I will qualitatively observe the process through which the

President, Executive staff, Congress, foreign policy elite, and the American public

interacted to determine the United States' decision regarding an international

organization. I will consider in detail how relevant causal factors may have influenced the

trajectory of America's foreign policy towards the United Nations. Finally, I will review

my hypothesis and the predictions offered by the theory of social networks and personal

relationships. I have found that the Roosevelt Administration had relatively strong social

networks and personal relationships. I am confident that the presence of this factor

strengthened FDR's work and facilitated the United States' decision to support the United

Nations.

*The Beginnings of the United Nations: FDR's Early Progressive Leadership*

Most of the work done to establish the United Nations and secure the United States' commitment to the organization was done in the last two terms of FDR's presidency. However, the formation of the United Nations began well before the official chartering of the organization at the San Francisco Conference on April 25th, 1945. In fact, many of the Americans involved in the formation of the United Nations witnessed the United States' abstention from the League of Nations. FDR, for example, saw Wilson's failure to pass the League of Nations first hand; "The Wilson administration also served as an apprenticeship for Roosevelt through which he could gain managerial skills within the federal bureaucracy…"[117] Young Progressives and internationalists, although divided in their policies, shared in their disappointment that the United States did not join and pioneer an international organization designed to preserve global peace and security. According to the United Nations Office at Geneva, "In spite of its political failure, the legacy of the League of Nations at the same time appears clearly in a number of principles stated by the Charter and in the competencies and experiences developed in the area of technical cooperation…"[118] Those who served in Wilson's Administration or observed it closely were motivated to avoid the President's failures while keeping some of the principles he espoused. With this in mind, foreign policy elite sought to test these principles and policies over the course of the next 25 years to shape a suitable international organization.

---

[117] Irwin F. Gellman, *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles*, (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1995), 7.

[118] "History: From the League of Nations to the United Nations." United Nations Office at Geneva. United Nations, Web.

It should be recognized that "…the unwieldy document *[the League Covenant]* was a pretty remarkable first effort that set in motion a twenty-year quest for a stable peace in a world that remained very unstable."[119] Before FDR's first election, FDR and young Progressives were thinking about international organizations and how to ensure that the United States would have a prominent role in the work of these institutions. According to James Strodes, this group of individuals engaged in politics from the 1920's-on included FDR, Sumner Welles, William Bullitt, Felix Frankfurter, Walter Lippmann, the Dulles siblings, and many more young politically minded individuals. Many in this group lived near Dupont Circle in the early 20th century and shared casual friendship. Although they were supportive of some of the Wilsonian perspective, many of them were dissatisfied with Wilson's leadership and their personal relationship with him. Even FDR eventually separated from Wilson, for "the antipathy the Wilsons had for him had morphed into a real hatred (Mrs. Wilson had barred him from the White House even on official business) that was public knowledge."[120]

As Wilson faded into political history, these young politically involved individuals began to form their own plans, policies, and relationships. For example, many of them became involved in the Council on Foreign Relations and the development of thinking on foreign policy for the next few decades. In particular, "FDR, through his friendship with Morgan banker Thomas Lamont, played an early role in helping to organize the American side of that conversation in what came to be known as the Council

---

[119] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 89.
[120] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 125.

on Foreign Relations."[121] To set a direction for his foreign policy and connect with the

Council, FDR published an article, "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View" in *Foreign*

*Affairs* in July 1928.[122] FDR and the young Progressives used much of the 1920's to sort

out the internationalist platform and be prepared to execute a foreign policy if they were

to be elected.

Just as Wilson was an integral figure in the story of the League of Nations, FDR

was tremendously important in the United States' commitment to the United Nations. In

contrast to Woodrow Wilson, who was known as a brilliant intellectual lacking strong

political and inter-personal skills, FDR was revered for his charisma, inter-personal

awareness, and political acumen. In a personal setting, "Roosevelt loved to laugh and

play, closing the space between people by familiarity, calling everyone, even Winston

Churchill, by his first name."[123] Notably, FDR was both amicable and savvy; "he was

charming, but also tricky and sometimes heartless. He wore his friendships lightly; at

time, he discarded them easily."[124] Growing up in a wealthy and politically involved

family, FDR received an Ivy League education and was exposed to the sensitive nature of

politics at a young age. His wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, also had a privileged upbringing and

was raised for social interaction at the highest levels of society. As a military servant and

bureaucrat in his early years, FDR continued to develop an understanding of the political

arena and how to navigate it. As a result, FDR developed a pragmatic approach to politics

---

[121] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 151.
[122] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our foreign policy: a democratic view." *Foreign Affairs* 6.4 (1928): 573-586.

[123] Doris Kearns Goodwin, *No Ordinary Time: Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II*, (Simon and Schuster, 2013) 24.
[124] Michael Fullilove, *Rendezvous with Destiny*, (New York: Penguin, 2013)10.

and was acutely aware of how his actions affected his staff, political peers, and public opinion. As ideas about the United Nations developed, FDR would practice this awareness.

Throughout his career, FDR set a precedent for his followers by leading with confidence and steering political elite towards his goals. According to Doris Goodwin, an FDR scholar, "No factor was more important to Roosevelt's leadership than his confidence in himself and in the American people."[125] FDR's confidence was important to setting his vision for the United Nations and commanding the respect of policy-makers and average citizens alike. Yet this confidence would not have had an impact had FDR not been diligent to harness his staff and network. After observing his leadership in foreign affairs, Isaiah Berlin, the famous British philosopher, noted that FDR "practiced a highly personal form of government."[126] Unlike Wilson, who was exclusive and not particularly personable, FDR actively interacted with his Executive staff and other political elite. FDR considered and consulted others' viewpoints, regardless of whether or not he would ultimately accept them; "By setting his advisors against each other, he tested the strength of their arguments. By diffusing authority, he maintained control."[127] In his foreign policy decision-making, FDR would gather information from his staff and act decisively; "If an issue needed resolution, competing subordinates had to plead their cases to the ultimate arbitrator. Roosevelt welcomed this competition; in fact, he thrived

---

[125] Doris Kearns Goodwin, *No Ordinary Time: Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II*, (Simon and Schuster, 2013) 46.
[126] Isaiah Berlin, *Personal Impressions*, ed. Henry Hardy. 2nd ed. (London: Pimlico, 1998), 21, 26.
[127] Michael Fullilove, *Rendezvous with Destiny*, (New York: Penguin, 2013) 11.

on it."[128] Yet unlike Wilson, FDR sought to manage his relationships and was often

successful.

In addition to his relationships with those within the Executive Branch, FDR held

many relationships with Congressmen and foreign policy actors such as academics, think

tank members, and military servants. As noted earlier, FDR ensured that he was

connected with the foreign policy community that "consisted of hundreds of individuals

of varying degrees of prominence who came to know each other (and of each other)

through government service, work outside of government, and through social

interaction."[129] One of these networks in which FDR participated, the Council on Foreign

Relations, embodies the foreign policy community. Additionally, as a Democrat, FDR

made it a priority in his early political years to cultivate relationships with Republicans.

He was known to be friends with long-term isolationist Senators like George Norris and

Burton Wheeler.[130] Concerning his foreign policy and his plans for the United Nations in

particular, FDR understood that he had to use his relationships and networks to build

support for the effort and ensure it was approved across government well before the time

came for it to be formally created. According to the Office of the Historian at the United

States Department of State, "Learning from Woodrow Wilson's failure to gain

Congressional support for the League of Nations, the Roosevelt Administration aimed to

include a wide range of the administration and elected officials in its effort to establish

---

[128] Irwin F. Gellman, *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles*, (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1995) 11 and 12.
[129] Jerel Rosati and James Scott, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, (Cengage Learning, 2013) 387.
[130] Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists: 1932-45*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

the proposed United Nations."[131] The steps FDR and his Administration took to do this will be discussed in later sections.

Like Wilson, FDR dealt with health issues throughout his political life. In 1921, at the age of 39, FDR was diagnosed with infantile paralysis, or polio.[132] While Wilson's health was generally kept private, FDR's health issues were publically known. Although faced with this problem, FDR sought to overcome his disabilities and did all he could to spend his time in social and political settings. Eleanor Roosevelt was diligent to take care of FDR and ensure he had the support he needed. Even towards the end of his time in office, he did not let his medical conditions affect him at meetings, negotiations, and conferences. At Yalta, "He showed no evidence of memory lapses, slurred speech, distractibility, or confusion."[133] A scholar of FDR's health, Richard Goldberg insists that the health issues FDR encountered did not impact his political leadership, and in some cases, it motivated it. For Goldberg, "The significant point about F.D.R.'s health was that he carried on so well for so many years in a position of responsibility that would have taxed the strength of the most vigorous able-bodied person."[134] Although FDR's poor health would eventually lead to his death on April 12, 1945, his ability to conduct business was not negatively affected to a great extent by these issues.

---

[131] "The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Oct. 2009. Web.

[132] Amy Berish, "FDR and Polio." Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum. Marist University, Web.

[133] Richard Thayer Goldberg, *The making of Franklin D. Roosevelt: triumph over disability*. (National l Book Network, 1981), 202.

[134] Richard Thayer Goldberg, *The making of Franklin D. Roosevelt: triumph over disability*, (National Book Network, 1981) 204.

*Early Years In Office: Politics and Strategy*

FDR assumed Presidential office for the first time on March 4, 1933 and would leave upon passing away in 1945 after being elected for a fourth term. Although fights about the United Nations mostly occurred in the latter half of FDR's presidency, he and the Progressives would start their journey to secure United States commitment early. Most importantly, as an internationalist and Progressives, FDR understood that he would face opposition from isolationists in his foreign policies, especially in his pursuit of United States commitment to an international organization. Isolationists favored economic and political separation from the global system and pushed for unilateralism over multilateralism in security and diplomatic relations. Although isolationists were not the only individuals to oppose international participation and cooperation, they were certainly a strong voice in the political forum. More generally, Republicans were reserved about international organizations like the League of Nations and later the United Nations. Even more, there would still be some division within the Democratic Party about the principles, policies, and practical rules an international organization would follow. The Roosevelt Administration and the Progressives would pay attention to all of these forces throughout FDR's presidential terms.

Active in the early 20$^{th}$ century, the doctrine of isolationism may have had a role in the downfall of the League of Nations and was evidently still present in American politics the 1930's and 1940's. Just as some of the American public and their Senators were reluctant to enter war and international entanglements before World War I, the public and elected officials were reluctant to do so again before and during World War

II.[135] In this chapter, I contend that social networks and relationships played a role in determining the direction (internationalist or isolationist) that America took. Battling some hesitancy towards the League, Wilson's relationships and networks hindered his League fight and he was unable to overcome anti-League sentiment. In contrast, due to his work on policy and in relationships, the President was a centerpiece in the transition from isolationism to American leadership in the international system. According to scholar Wayne Cole, "Roosevelt's relations with American isolationists from 1932 to 1945 had enduring significance..."[136] Across foreign policy circles, the Progressive internationalists understood the importance of engaging with isolationists. In order to be successful, they would need to handle the any sentiments in the political arena and in the American public that would oppose internationalist policies.

Espousing an internationalist foreign policy, FDR promoted multilateralism and United States participation in an international organization to preserve peace. In light of isolationism and concerns from Republicans, FDR knew his Administration would have to work to get policy approved on the domestic front by the government and the American people. Therefore, in his first term, FDR immediately began building a team with a mind towards deconstructing the barriers to and building support for the internationalist foreign policy. Young progressives and democrats mostly supported FDR, but FDR even garnered the favor of some isolationists. In the 1932 election, "If leading isolationists had been forced to line up on one side or the other…most would

---

[135] Adam J. Berinsky et al, "Revisiting Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44.03 (2011): 515-520.

[136] Wayne S Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists: 1932-45*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983) 3.

have been with Roosevelt."[137] In fact, FDR had previous relationships with Senators

George Norris and Burton Wheeler and used these as a building block for his outreach to

isolationists and Republicans. Isolationists "…had been courted by the President in the

campaign of 1936, and they had actively supported his reelection."[138]

FDR was intent on developing a relationship with Congress and exercising

positive leadership in the face of challenges any opposition presented. One way to do so

was to include a Republican in his Cabinet. FDR asked multiple isolationists to serve,

including Phillip La Follette from Wisconsin and Hiram Johnson from California.

Although Johnson declined, he noted of FDR, "I liked him, and I liked his manner. He is

genial, kindly, and sympathetic… he is just a human being."[139] After a few denials, FDR

secured a progressive Republican, Harold L. Ickes of Chicago, to serve as his Secretary

of the Interior. FDR was also thoughtful in picking his diplomatic staff. Scholar Irwin

Gellman noted how methodical this process was:

> "Not only did the President handpick every major political diplomatic appointee
>
> at the start of the New Deal, he also spent a considerable amount of time deciding
>
> who should go where…these selections might also have been a slap at
>
> professional diplomats, against who the president had deeply rooted prejudice
>
> arising from his experiences in Wilson's administration."[140]

---

[137] Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists: 1932-45*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983) 25.
[138] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 236.
[139] Johnson to Hiram Johnson, Jr., Johnson Papers, January 22, 1933,
[140] Irwin F. Gellman, *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles*, (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1995) 20.

FDR had close relationships with many of his diplomatic staff, including William

Phillips, his first undersecretary of state, and Sumner Welles, the second undersecretary.

Welles was FDRs most trusted advisor and was arguably FDRs most important

relationship throughout the formation of the United Nations. As the next section will

discuss, Welles was a key piece in the Administration's effort to build support for the

United Nations. Surely, FDR was commanding in his leadership and did not always listen

to his staff, but "although much has been made of Roosevelt's activist style and refusal to

consult with his own diplomatic advisers, by the end of the first term the president had

demonstrated that he was far more consistent than many of his critics thought."[141]

FDR also consulted Progressives and isolationists when deciding on his Secretary

of State. Ultimately, he decided on a Cordell Hull, a Senator from Tennessee; "His

appointment did not greatly impress isolationists—but neither did it displease them…"[142]

Hull was a strong Democrat and did not come from the traditional Ivy League and Wall

Street networks that FDR circled.[143] Hull was ideologically moderate within the

Democratic Party and thus was effective at mediating between antagonists and

facilitating cooperation. As a result, Hull was popular and liked among voters and foreign

policy actors. While FDR was fond of Hull, their relationships was not perfect; "Even

tough the two men bonded as political allies, they were not personal friends, and never

would be. They respected each other's political acumen, and such a meeting of the minds

---

[141] Irwin F. Gellman, *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles*, (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1995) 92.

[142] Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists: 1932-45*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983) 35.

[143] Memorandum on Hull, Farely Papers, Oct. 15, 1933.

was essential, in the president's view, for a secretary of state."[144] According to Irwin

Gellman, FDR marginalized Hull in many ways and was not thrilled to use the

Department of State. However, despite these troubles, Hull helped FDR develop and

extend his network. Additionally, the Department of State's work on the internationalist

cause and the United Nations was important to the United States' role in the organization.

*Pre-War: The Planning Begins*

The second war that ravaged that 20th century world began in Europe in 1939. The

United States did not join until December 1941. Before World War II stirred, the

Roosevelt Administration began favored implementing an international organization to

ensure peace and security. In his Quarantine Speech on October 5, 1937, FDR charged

that "the peace-loving nations of the world must make a concerted efforts to uphold laws

and principles on which alone peace can rest secure."[145] At this point, the American

public and many political elite held isolationist concerns about foreign intervention and

international cooperation.[146] FDR's gesture towards international multilateral efforts was

poorly received and as a result, the Administration continued a public foreign policy of

non-involvement and neutrality. Just like Wilson, FDR waited to get involved in the war

and any international cooperation to address issues of peace. He understood the

sensitivity of international action given the hostility on the home front.

Still, however, the Administration began actively building the groundwork of

support for an international organization and more broadly, an internationalist foreign

---

[144] Irwin F. Gellman, *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles*, (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1995) 31.

[145] *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Constitution Prevails*, 1937 (1941): 406-11.

[146] Adam J. Berinsky, *In time of war: Understanding American public opinion from World War II to Iraq*, (University of Chicago Press, 2009).

policy to be implemented after the war. Well before the formal discussions regarding the United Nations, "Roosevelt and Hull were determined to avoid the fate of Woodrow Wilson, who had failed to obtain Senate acceptance of the Covenant that he had done so much to write…Although public support was essential to the success of their long-term policy of postwar international collaboration, Senate support was even of greater immediate importance."[147] In planning for the United Nations, internal coordination and cooperation with the Congress would be critical. In order to accomplish their goals, "It was increasingly clear to establishment Progressives—at CFR, at the State Department, and even inside the White House—that the time to plan America's strategy for after a new Great War was before that war started in earnest."[148]

Internally, the Administration experienced some personal and political division starting in the pre-war period, but FDR and others sought to manage it and often had success. Irwin Gellman, finding that most of the tension was between FDR, Hull, and Welles, maintains, "This trio established the nation's main diplomatic guidelines while simultaneously struggling to maintain their emotional stability."[149] FDR was not personally close with Secretary Hull but maintained a cordial relationship with him and many individuals at the Department of State during his four terms. FDR included Hull in many diplomatic talks, such as the major conferences, and tasked him with much of the work on the United Nations. However, he did not seek his advice constantly. In contrast, FDR had a close personal relationship with Undersecretary Sumner Welles and actively

---

[147] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 2.

[148] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 242.

[149] Irwin F. Gellman, *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles*, (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1995) x.

trusted with him on the United Nations project. Over the course of most of their

professional careers, "Sumner Welles had been Franklin Roosevelt's protégé and

remained a closely identified friend both of FDR and especially of Eleanor."[150] Over the

course of his career, FDR trusted Welles with many diplomatic missions and used his

advice on foreign policy matters; "He was also intrigued by the practice of President

Woodrow Wilson… of using Colonel Edward M. House as a roving diplomatic

envoy."[151] Unlike Wilson, though, FDR kept his envoys close, included them in his

planning, and treated them well.

The greatest tension within the Administration was between Secretary Hull and

Undersecretary Welles, who did not get along personally and often competed for the

President's attention and respect. More startling, many in Roosevelt's Administration did

not approve of Welles' sexual activities. Welles was intoxicated often and engaged in

homosexual affairs. According to historian Gaddis Smith, "Sumner Welles ranks among

the half-dozen most influential American career diplomats of this century. And among

high officials brought down by sexual scandal, he has no rivals."[152] William Bullitt,

former diplomat for Wilson and current diplomat in the Roosevelt Administration, stood

against Sumner Welles on this issue and many others. Ultimately, Welles' activities

would lead to his resignation, although his affairs were not publically shamed.

Throughout his relationship with Hull, Welles still held respect for Hull, writing, "…it

would be impossible for any man in my position, who has been so closely associated with

the Secretary—who has had the opportunity of being associated with a man of his

---

[150] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 133.
[151] Michael Fullilove, *Rendezvous with Destiny*, (New York: Penguin, 2013) 14.
[152] Gaddis Smith, "Spheres of Influence." Books. New York Times, 25 Jan. 1998. Web.

extraordinary moral courage and consistency, and I think an almost unique intellectual integrity—to have anything but except very deep devotion for him."[153] Although Hull did not like Welles, he tried to work with him over the course of their terms.

Against this backdrop, FDR and staff within the Administration worked to plan for the United Nations. Hull and Welles began forming a post-war policy "as early as January, 1940… the Department of State had set up a commission under Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles and Ambassador Hugh R. Wilson to plan policies for the postwar period."[154] Welles started to investigate the form and shape a new world organization would take. He and his team sought to learn from the League of Nations and address its inadequacies with new solutions that would be acceptable to United States lawmakers, officials, and citizens. The exact formulation of the United Nations will be discussed in the next section.

By the direction of FDR, Hull was also building a network with Congressmen, including isolationists. To further this planning, the Senate authorized the Committee on Foreign Relations to study questions pertaining to the establishment of a lasting peace. In their preliminary investigations, the Committee consulted Department of State leaders like Hull and Welles, with whom they had developed a relationship.[155] Eventually, FDR incorporated the preliminary vision for the United Nations in the Atlantic Charter, which was released on August 14, 1941 as a joint effort with Winston Churchill. The Charter

---

[153] Harold Boaz Hinton. *Cordell Hull: a biography*, (Doubleday, Doran, 1942) 363.
[154] Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists: 1932-45*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983) 516.
[155] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 32.

referenced "the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security."[156]

Consistent with his strategy, the President involved multiple members of his staff in these

conversations, including Welles and Hull.

During this preliminary planning period, FDR and his Executive staff engaged

multiple networks to build general support for multilateralism and international

cooperation in addressing global issues. Ultimately, as he faced these tasks, "Franklin

Roosevelt was, then a leader who disliked faceless bureaucracies, distrusted his foreign

ministry, craved information, and enjoyed personal diplomacy."[157] Although scholar

Michael Fullilove may go too far in characterizing FDR as distrusting of the Department

of State, FDR certainly preferred to lead and did not always let his staff and Executive

agencies conduct political business independently. Instead, FDR was personally involved

in these matters as much as possible. As discussed early, FDR was well connected with

the foreign policy community and would begin to use this going into World War II;

"Franklin Roosevelt now had the cadre of faithful supporters around him that he had

carefully selected more than a decade earlier…"[158] These friends would be an important

piece in the process to gain United States approval of the United Nations.

FDR also maintained his relationship with the Council on Foreign Relations

throughout the pre-war planning period. James Strodes notes, "The CFR and *Foreign

Affairs* would prove an important asset for Roosevelt. He would use the quarterly as a

sounding board over the years as he formed his broad policy beliefs, and the CFR

membership would be the center core of his network of advisors and supporters…And

---

[156] "Atlantic Charter." Avalon Project, 14 Aug. 1941. Web.

[157] Michael Fullilove, *Rendezvous with Destiny*, (New York: Penguin, 2013) 13.

[158] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 209.

the Progressives, especially the Dupont Circle veterans, were willing to oblige…"[159]

With the United States' entry into World War II, FDR, his Administration, and his network would divert their attention to conflict. Still, the Administration would continue to plan for an IGO throughout the war. The failures of Woodrow Wilson were no doubt in their mind. Fortunately, however, they had already begun to build support for the effort through policy, diplomacy, and relationships.

*Wartime and the United Nations*

FDR and the Executive branch still devoted some attention to post-war planning throughout World War II. As the Allied Forces coalesced against the Axis, FDR and foreign leaders began to conceive of this effort as a multilateral "United Nations."[160] The Big Four, which included the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, would unite in this effort. Just as their predecessors did during World War I, these leaders believed they could use their alliance during the war to build a global IGO that would arbitrate global issues and preserve peace. Edgar Robinson, a scholar of FDR's leadership, notes that "Much, if not all, of the President's policy that came to be identified as American foreign policy during the war, was based upon the belief that a United Nations Organization would take the place of the principle of 'balance of power' as the great determining force in the international relations of the future."[161] If the cooperative and multilateral effort in the war could be transferred to the post-war world with a strong underpinning, the United Nations would succeed. However, achieving such

---

[159] James Stodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 153-154.

[160] "Declaration by the United Nations." A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949. The Avalon Project, 1 Jan. 1942. Web.

[161] Edgar E. Robinson, *The Roosevelt Leadership: 1933-1945*, (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1955) 308.

a transition in foreign affairs would require time; in a personal letter to Isolationist Senator George Norris, FDR noted, "…time is an essential in disseminating the ideals of peace… that is why I am inclined to believe that we should have a trial or transition period after the fighting stops."[162]

In order to pioneer an organization that could accomplish this purpose, FDR believed that the United States leadership would be essential. Recalling the United States' lack of support for the League of Nations, FDR "felt that this time, the United States needed to play a leading role both in the creation of the organization, and in the organization itself.  Moreover, in contrast to the League, the new organization needed the power to enforce key decisions."[163] Ensuring this leadership and power would most certainly require both diplomacy and domestic support. The emergence of the United States as a leader of the Allied Forces provided opportunity:

> "There was widespread agreement within the administration that the United States should use its role as leader of the wartime United Nations to further the organization of the world in a way that would maintain postwar peace… especially in view of the long American tradition of political isolation, and the less remote history of Woodrow Wilson's attempt to commit the United States to participate in the first world security organization, both President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull were concerned to carry Congress and the public with them every step of the way."[164]

---

[162] Roosevelt to Norris, September 21, 1943, George W. Norris Papers

[163] "The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Oct. 2009. Web.

[164] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 92-93.

Throughout the war, FDR and his Administration maintained this perspective as they developed the United Nations as an international organization.

As wartime ensued, "Secretary Hull endeavored to make postwar planning during the Second World War more foresighted than that of the House Inquiry…preparations were begun early and were largely centered in his department as the one chiefly responsible for advising the President…"[165] Agreements on the general concept of the United Nations organization at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences, which involved FDR and Executive staff, allowed Secretary Hull to begin serious planning and study the domestic requirements for the organization. This would include studying the constitutional requirements for such an organization. In 1942, the Department of State, Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles initiated the Advisory Committee on Post-war Foreign Policy to advise FDR. Over the course of the year, "The Committee gradually mushroomed to forty-eight members, eleven from the State Department and the remainder from Congress and other public and governmental agencies."[166] This Committee included experts from inside government, such as Leo Pasvolsky, Dean Acheson, George Marshall, and Henry Wallace. Quite importantly, the Committee consulted foreign policy elite from outside government, such as Isaiah Bowman, Norman Davis, and many other CFR members.

The Subcommittee on International Organization formally shaped the framework of the United Nations; by March 1943, it "had drafted a formal proposal to establish a new, more effective international organization…Cordell Hull took the proposal to

---

[165] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 205.
[166] Irwin F. Gellman, *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles*, (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1995) 288.

members of Congress in an effort to build bipartisan support for the proposed postwar

organization."[167] As a result, multiple Congressional resolutions emerged to support

United States leadership and membership in an international organization. According to

Wayne Cole, "In 1943, the Fulbright Resolution in the House and the Connally

Resolution in the Senate won overwhelming approval; they were designed to proclaim

that Congress would not block American membership in the world organization to be

created at the close of World War II as it had done after World War I."[168]

The relationship between the Administration and Congress, exercised in formal

and informal bipartisan consultations, would be critical in the development of the draft

United Nations Charter.  Cordell Hull was very intent on cultivating personal

relationships with Congressmen and utilizing the Administration's network to secure a

strong role for the United States in the United Nations. At these stages, FDR and Hull

were not greatly fond of one another, but were publically genial and politically adept.[169]

While FDR directed policy, he managed his staff with ease. Scholar Ruth Russell notes:

"As 1943 progressed, the public and the Congress displayed increasing interest in

the organization of peace… In consultations with congressional leaders, Secretary

Hull continued to emphasize the need for advance agreement in both the Senate

and the House of Representatives on simple resolutions acceptable to an

---

[167] "The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Oct. 2009. Web.
[168] Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists: 1932-45*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983) 13.
[169] Irwin F. Gellman, *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles*, (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1995) 310.

overwhelming majority, which would thus provide solid support for negotiations by the Executive…"[170]

Hull relied on his established relationships with Congressmen from the 1930's to secure legislatures that were willing to stand behind the United Nations concept. FDR and Hull's early outreach to isolationists like Senator Vandenberg paved the way for Republican resolutions in favor of "responsible participation by the United States in postwar cooperative organization…"[171] Hull worked with Democratic Senator Tom Connally to coordinate a "Committee of Eight" to work on the draft American proposal for the United Nations Charter. Under Hull's leadership, "The Department of State continued to develop its proposals and discussed them with leading members of Congress between April and June, after which Hull obtained the President's formal approval to transmit them to the other major powers…" in advance of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in August 1944.

Key Congressmen supported the United Nations in the lead-up to the end of World War II. Vandenberg was hesitant to commit fully to the plans before peace was resolved, particularly because he distrusted FDR and his potentially secret dealings with foreign leaders. However, when asked if he would oppose proposals, Senator Vandenberg "instantly said that not for a moment would he fail to cooperate to perfect the document."[172] Vandenberg worked often with Hull and as a result developed a trust of the Administration. The conversations between Cordell Hull, his staff, and Congressmen were fruitful, ensuring enough support for the United Nations. Senator Connally

---

[170] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 125.

[171] Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (1952): 56-58.

[172] Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (1952): 1660.

contended that the Roosevelt Administration exhibited "a disposition…[rare] in American history, for the executive to work closely with the legislative branch in the formulation of policy."[173] Unlike Wilson with the League, FDR and his Executive team worked on many fronts well before the end of the war to establish and shape the international organization that would seek to ensure global peace and cooperation.

United States support for the United Nations required relationship building across the government and political world, often without partisan affiliation. Beginning well before wartime, "that bipartisan, or nonpartisan, approach toward postwar planning for peace continued through the presidential election of 1944," setting up the chartering of the United Nations after the war.[174] According to Ruth Russell, "Probably no other major governmental policy has ever been the product of so many minds as the American proposals for an international organization. Numerous private organizations devoted themselves during the war years to studying the problems of the postwar period…" including Council on Foreign Relations, American Association for the United Nations, and Foreign Policy Association.[175] While also working with Congress, FDR and his Administration engaged these entities and the American public as the Charter for the United Nations formed. Through this engagement, actors of the foreign policy establishment involved in post-war planning came together to champion liberal internationalism.[176] According to scholar Hodgson, this consisted of "the internationally

---

[173] Connally, p 267, as quoted by Ruth Russell.
[174] Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists: 1932-45,* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983) 526.
[175] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958).
[176] Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of internationalism: Public opinion and American foreign policy*, (Duke University Press, 1990).

minded lawyers, bankers and executives of international corporations in New York; the government officials in Washington; and the academics."[177]

Public opinion was generally in favor of an international organization throughout this time, just as in the case of the League of Nations. FDR was adept at communicating with the mass public; he "employed the idioms of mass culture to close the perceptual gap between him and his mass audience."[178] FDR conveyed the importance of international cooperation to the general public and ensured he had their support in his endeavor. Hull worried about public opinion early in the war, only to discover that "almost three-fourths of those surveyed favored the United States' joining world organization after the war."[179] The Department of State sought to ensure public opinion was included in the shaping of the United Nations and continued "the process of developing public support for the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, of collecting both official and unofficial views on them, and of reconsidering points that received significant criticism…[180] Ultimately, FDR knew that endorsement from the foreign policy community would be strong leverage to push for the United Nations in Congress and across the United States Government. FDR had connected with this network of the American public; "To him, 'the public' consisted of those groups outside government whose attitudes at a given time might have a significant impact on his political plans."[181]

---

[177] Godfrey Hodgson, "The establishment." *Foreign Policy* 10 (1973): 8.

[178] David Michael Ryfe, "Franklin Roosevelt and the fireside chats." *Journal of communication* 49.4 (1999): 80-103.

[179] Irwin F. Gellman, *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles*, (Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1995) 294.

[180] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 590.

[181] Richard W. Steele, "The pulse of the people. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the gauging of American public opinion." *Journal of Contemporary History* (1974): 195.

Heading into the final years of the war, public opinion was supportive of the United

Nations. The long road to the United Nations Charter was coming to a close.

In 1944 and early 1945, the Roosevelt Administration solidified the composition

of the United Nations in preparation for the finalization of the organization after the war.

These leaders sought to correct the League of Nations failure to enforce obligations and

have power in international affairs. Many within the United States, including Hull and

Pasvolsky, "favored organizing world security on the basis of the same general type of

institution as the League of Nations, but endowed with more power to maintain the

peace."[182] This translated to a Security Council with more power and other mechanisms

of enforcement. Sumner Welles, however, insisted the United Nations include all states;

even after he had left the Administration, FDR listened to this advice and ensured

components like the General Assembly were intact. In international diplomatic affairs,

FDR and his staff worked at conferences with foreign leaders to ensure agreement with

concepts like the Security Council, the General Assembly, the ancillary agencies of the

organization, and its authority in international affairs.

After a long and multiple-year process, "On May 29, 1944, Secretary Hull

concluded his review of the developing plans for postwar organization with the senators

from the Committee on Foreign Relations."[183] Through both diplomatic talks and

domestic consolations, the Administration had shaped a Charter that ensured a role for

the General Assembly, a Security Council giving power to the big four, general

procedures, enforcement powers, and regulation of armaments. At the Dumbarton Oaks

---

[182] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 206.
[183] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 393.

Conference in late 1944, delegations from around the world came to discuss the United

Nations and continue to formulate the organization that would be formalized the

following year. The Conference featured much of the work on the Charter done by the

United States to date. When Secretary Hull submitted his resignation in November 1944

due to failing health, his work was remembered.  While Hull and FDR had endured many

conflicts and tensions, FDR was grateful for Hull and their personal relationship. He

wrote:

> "It has been very sad for me to even contemplate the ending of our close
>
> relationships during all these twelve years. It is not merely that our personal
>
> relations have been so uniformly and invariably agreeable, or that our joint work
>
> has borne true success in so many fields, as it is the personal feeling of not being
>
> able to lean on you for aid and intimate interchange of thought."[184]

As Edward Stettinius became Secretary of State, Cordell Hull was remembered fondly.

From this time onwards, the United States Government was in full support of the

United Nations. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, with the conclusion of World

War II ahead, the Allied Powers agreed to convene a conference in San Francisco to

formally charter the United Nations. Demonstrating its leadership, the United States

would host the conference and its delegation "included Secretary Stettinius, former

Secretary Hull, Senators Connally and Vandenberg, Representatives Bloom and Eaton,

Dean Gildersleeve and Commander Stassen. Its composition…*[this]* publicly

demonstrated the governmental policy of maintaining bipartisan political support behind

---

[184] FDR to Hull, Hull Papers, Nov. 21, 1944.

the projected organization."[185] Participants in the conference were from across

government, across parties, and across the foreign policy world.

*The United Nations "Officially" Born: San Francisco Charter*

By the time the San Francisco Conference opened in April 25th, 1945, President

Roosevelt had passed away, Secretary Hull's term had passed, and many of the foreign

policy actors involved in the laying the groundwork had transitioned out of office.

However, the Roosevelt Administration had gained full approval from Congress, political

elite, and the American public to commit to leading the United Nations. Most of the work

to secure the United States' willingness to participate had been completed over the past

fifteen year. As the war ended and a new international system was formed, the United

States would not repeat its foreign policy actions after the World War I.

President Truman and the San Francisco delegation worked alongside delegations

from around the world for two months, from April 25th to June 25th, to officially produce

and sign the United Nations Charter. The San Francisco Conference was the final step to

the United Nations' completion and "Countries around the globe were genuinely astir

about the event."[186] Unlike the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference, these delegates

were making the final touches on an organization they had been crafting together for

many years. Illustrative of this, the United States Congress reiterated its endorsement

throughout the process;  "Although the San Francisco Conference did not end until late

June, the Senate gave its consent to ratification before the Potsdam meeting was over…

to emphasize the importance of the occasion, he [Truman] personally delivered the

---

[185] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 591.
[186] Stephen C. Schlesinger, *Act of creation: The founding of the United Nations*, (Basic Books, 2009) 8.

Charter to the presiding officer of the Senate on July 2, 1945."[187] FDR's relationships and

networks had generally built support for the United Nations. By extension, Secretary

Hull's collaboration with Congress garnered the necessary approval. For this reason, he is

remembered as a Father of the United Nations and "the one person in all the world who

has done the most to make this great plan for peace an effective fact."[188]

Knowing all of the work that had been done on the United Nations over the last

decades, Truman asked the Senate to ratify the Charter, as it was, or reject it completely.

The Senators that had collaborated on the organization returned to advocate for its

official ratification. Unlike the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant,

which failed tumultuous ratification process, the United Nations Charter was received

favorably. Senate and House hearings did not last long, featured supportive witnesses

from across the foreign policy world, and faced very few opponents. Ultimately, the

process yielded prompt and unreserved Senate ratification on August 8, 1945. Scholar

Ruth Russell asserts, quite accurately:

> "The Charter of the United Nations symbolized, for the United States, its change
>
> during the Second World War from a policy of political isolationism to one of
>
> international cooperation. To a greater extent than is generally realized, the
>
> Charter grew out of proposals developed by the United States Government to
>
> establish an international organization through which, in large part, that new
>
> policy could be carried out…"[189]

---

[187] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 985.
[188] Jahn, Gunnar. "Award Ceremony Speech." The Nobel Prize.10 Dec. 1945. Web.
[189] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 1.

*Assessing the Hypothesis*

This case study focuses on the causal process by which relationships and networks within between the Roosevelt Administration and other foreign policy actors affected United States foreign policy. Like in case study one, I have not predicted a mono-causal explanation, but rather sought to understand if the variable of social relationships has some role in the political outcomes considered. In this section, I will review the case study in terms of the theory and hypothesis I presented in earlier chapters. As I predicted, I have found that strong social networks and personal relationships had a causal impact on the United States' decision to commit to and lead the United Nations. In order to demonstrate this, I will systematically judge whether or not this case meets the criteria for strong social networks and personal relationships. Consistent with the purpose of a qualitative historical analysis, I will assess how the presence or absence of these factors had causal impact in the case considered.

*Positive Emotional Ties*

According to the theory, positive emotional ties are defined as social interactions, comments, or conversations between two or more individuals that demonstrate strong social standing and friendship. The case study demonstrated mostly positive emotional ties within the Roosevelt Administration and between the leaders of the Administration and Congressmen. As the study has detailed, FDR was himself incredibly amicable and well liked by most of his staff, Congressmen, and many foreign policy actors involved in the United States' foreign policy circles. FDR's staff had positive emotional impressions of the President. Within the Department of State, Cordell Hull and William Bullitt did not have fond emotional feelings towards Sumner Welles due to his sexual practices and

personal flavor. Still, Welles was integral to the United States' commitment to the United

Nations. While Welles eventually had to resign, FDR defended him as a friend, managing

the internal tensions within his staff. In a letter to William Bullitt in which FDR refuted

Bullitt's dislike of Welles, FDR wrote, "You cannot speak that way about Welles to me.

So far as Welles is concerned, he is an exceptionally able, honest, straight-forward, high-

minded public servant."[190]

FDR and his staff also developed positive relationships with Congressmen and in

particular, isolationists like George Norris and Vandenberg that would be critical for the

Senate's support of the United Nations. FDR deployed Cordell Hull, who was well

respected and liked in his time as a Senator, to develop strong relationships with

Congressmen well before the fight for the United Nations. In addition to these

relationships with Congressmen, FDR and his staff were well connected with the foreign

policy community. As noted previously, FDR was close friends with a large number of

Council on Foreign Relations members and maintained his relationship the organization

throughout his presidency. Additionally, FDR and his wife were friends with many

political elite such as Walter Lippmann, the Dulles Brothers, Felix Frankfurter, and

others. As the United Nations was beginning to come together, James Strodes notes that

the Dupont Circle friends "…could take momentary satisfaction in redeeming the

promises they had all made together when they were very young and arguing

passionately around the dinner table at the House of Truth."[191] While not every

relationship FDR held was positive, many were.

---

[190] Daniels diary, Oct. 6, 1943
[191] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 279.

*Trust*

Trust within social networks and personal relationships is constituted by a belief by one or parties that the other individual to be genuine and reliable. There appears to be strong evidence for trust in relationships in the FDR era and only a few examples of distrust. Generally, FDR was considered to be trustworthy by his staff and foreign policy actors. Equally as important, and unlike Wilson, FDR was willing to trust many within the Executive Branch to do various tasks for him. Scholar Michael Fullilove details FDR's trust of five individuals, including Sumner Welles, to carry out diplomatic missions between 1939 and 1941; "Over this critical period, then Roosevelt entrusted five very different men, only one of whom was a professional diplomat, with seven important assignments in Europe. This represents an extraordinary passage of politics and diplomacy."[192] Again, Sumner Welles stands as an example of a strong and trustworthy personal relationship, because in his work with FDR, "…Welles had emerged not only as a personal confidant of both Franklin and Eleanor but also as the candidate's chief source of foreign policy advice…"[193] Although FDR was sometimes unwilling to fully trust Cordell Hull to advise his foreign policy and make foreign policy decisions, the two trusted each other in their work with Congress and the foreign policy community as they sought to garner support for the United Nations. Outside of the Executive Branch, Hull developed trust with Congressmen over the course of their terms in office. In cases where Congressmen did not trust FDR, Hull helped to mediate the potential implications. For example, Senator Vandenberg was suspicious of FDR having secret deals with allies

---

[192] Michael Fullilove, *Rendezvous with Destiny*, (New York: Penguin, 2013) 9.
[193] James Strodes, *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives Who Shaped Our World*, (Counterpoint Press, 2012) 214.

abroad. However, Hull had a fairly trustworthy relationship with Vandenberg and worked

against the distrust Vandenberg held for FDR.

*High Information Exchange and Frequency of Interaction*

Social networks and personal relationships marked with high information

exchange have high rates of relational interaction and communication involving sharing

of information between two or more actors. Additionally, high frequency of interaction is

present when there are a high number of exchanges and large amount of face time

between two or more individuals in any given institution or organization. Of the factors

that show the presence of social networks and personal relationships as causal agents in

foreign policy decision-making, this factor was most present in this case.  Within his

Executive branch, FDR often met with his staff, interacting formally and informally and

sharing information regarding United Nations issues. Entrusting the Department of State

to do much of the investigation and planning on the United Nations, "the President

repeatedly gave support to the work of the agencies of the Department of State, using

their prepared materials in conferences held at Teheran, Cairo, and Yalta."[194] FDR met

often with Hull, Welles, and other Department of State officials to discuss the United

Nations. Outside of his staff, FDR interacted with foreign policy actors through avenues

such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Dupont Circle group. According to

Ruth Russell, "Consultation with such groups and consideration of their developing ideas

were an integral part of the process of government planning for the postwar period."[195]

Well before the United Nations was formally founded, FDR felt compelled that United

---

[194] Edgar E. Robinson, *The Roosevelt Leadership: 1933-1945*, (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1955) 317.
[195] Ruth B Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 216.

States leadership would be essential, and such leadership would not be compelled without broad support from the foreign policy community.

Through the work of Secretary Hull, Sumner Welles, and members of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, the Roosevelt Administration frequently interacted with Congress and shared information as the United Nations Charter was being developed. Hull wrote to the President, "…the Senate is very jealous of its prerogatives in foreign policy, with the result that we are obliged to be discreet in working with the two Houses in connection with these subjects."[196] As multiple historians describe, Cordell Hull and his staff made many trips to Congress to consult the Foreign Relations Committees. During their work on the United Nations Charter proposals, the Department of State sought to incorporate feedback from Congressmen and gain approval on every aspect of the policy. The evidence shows that FDR and Hull believed that a lot of planning before the end of the war was important to secure the support of Congress and ensure the United States was committed to the United Nations. For this reason, they sought to interact with and share information with internationalist and isolationist Congressmen. This planning would enable them to gain the approval necessary.

*High Number of Networks and Relationships*

In the United Nations process, there were a large number of connections and ties between an individual or group to other individuals or groups. FDR and his Administration were extremely intentional and effective in accumulating networks and relationships as they formulated the United Nations.  Most fundamentally, Wayne Cole contends, "Roosevelt shaped his peace views over the course of many years, in countless

---

[196] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (*Vol. II, 1948) 1263.

private conversations, and in hours of private reflecting."[197] FDR and his staff were

engaged in many networks and relationships throughout the four terms of the

Administration. In fact, Irwin Goodwin notes that unlike Wilson, "Throughout his

*[FDR's]* presidency, he repeatedly displayed an uncanny ability to toss a number of balls

up in the air and keep them afloat."[198]

      FDR maintained relationships with his staff, Congressmen, and foreign policy

actors across Washington D.C. and up the east coast over the years of his presidency.

FDR and his Administration had strong social relationships with many individuals in both

the internationalist and isolationist communities. The Council on Foreign Relations and

other foreign policy organizations increased the size of this network and the number of

personal relationships FDR could access. FDR's longer duration in office afforded him

time to increase his network and begin utilizing it well before most Presidents can as they

seek to push a policy. In their public efforts, as a general rule, the Administration actively

reached out to a high number of groups, organizations, and citizens. After the Dumbarton

Oaks conference, "The Department worked in concert with interested groups to inform

the public about the United Nations and even dispatched officials around the country to

answer questions on the proposed organization.  By the end of the effort, the Department

of State had coordinated almost 500 such meetings."[199] Unlike the League tour, this effort

was not interrupted and gained many allies to the United Nations proposals.

---

[197] Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists: 1932-45*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983) 515.

[198] Doris Kearns Goodwin, *No Ordinary Time: Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II*, (Simon and Schuster, 2013) 136.

[199] "The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 - October 1945." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Oct. 2009. Web.

*Alternative Explanations*

In this case study, I have touch on how other factors, such as interests, institutions, and ideas, may explain the political outcome of the United States choosing to participate in and lead the United Nations. While this will be mostly discussed in Chapter Five, each factor appears to have some role in the United States decisions to join the United. Material interests in preserving United States power and national security seem to have led Congressmen and political elite to join the United Nations, as unlike the League of Nations, it included a spot on a Security Council that reflected power. Under institutional theory, the decision to commit can be explained by the development of the United Nations' institutional framework over many years and the low risk for domestic institutions. Ruth Russell notes:

> "The fact that so much in the way of specific commitments was either left to the future (as the military agreements), or surrounded by the safeguard of reservation (as in the case of domestic and compulsory jurisdiction, or dependent on specific United States concurrence (as with the veto in the Security Council) was an important factor in obtaining the strong Senate support."[200]

Lastly, ideological unification on the internationalist policy over the course of the 1930's and 1940's seems to play some role in these outcomes. Isolationism dwindled in Congress and the American public as leadership and average citizens alike became interested in not again repeating a World War. In Chapter Five, I will weigh each explanation alongside social networks and personal relationships as causal factors in the divergence of foreign policy towards the League of Nations and United Nations. Chapter

---

[200] Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958) 942.

Five will synthesize competing explanations, piece together a satisfactory and

comprehensive understanding of the puzzle of United States foreign policy decision-

making, and conclude.

*Conclusion*

In this case study, I have confirmed my hypothesis that social networks and

personal relationships were strong and meaningful, at least to some extent, in the United

States' diverging decision to commit to the United Nations. Each factor was present in

the process through which the Roosevelt Administration and United States Congress

came to support the United Nations. The case study demonstrates the causal steps that the

Roosevelt Administration took to push for a multilateral, internationalist policy towards

the United Nations. In the next chapter, I will synthesize these finding alongside the

explanatory stories and frameworks of realism, institutionalism, and constructivism. I

will conclude my investigation and summarize why a study of social networks and

personal relationships can help scholars understand this divergence in United States

foreign policy and foreign policy decision-making more generally.

Chapter Five: Synthesis, Assessment, and Conclusion

*Introduction*

In this investigation, I have raised a puzzle of foreign policy decision-making, outlined an explanatory theory of social networks and personal relationships, and conducted two case studies to investigate the presence of these factors and their causal role in the United States' foreign policy decisions to reject the League of Nations and lead the United Nations. The Wilson and FDR Administrations both sought to commit the United States to international organizations in similar circumstance. In both cases, the United States was emerging from a World War and facing conflicting isolationist and internationalist political sentiments. My findings have proven consistent with my hypotheses that Wilson and his Administration exemplified weak social networks and personal relationships while FDR and his Administration demonstrated strong social networks and personal relationships. Through an analysis of the causal process in each case, I have illustrated that this divergence is at least somewhat responsible for the divergence of outcomes in foreign policy decision-making.

My research demonstrates that had Wilson and his Executive staff held better social networks and personal relationships both inside and outside their Administration, they would have been more likely to have success in getting the United States to commit to the League of Nations. I found that Wilson and his Administration had negative emotional ties, signs of distrust, low information exchange and interaction, and a low number of networks and relationships. Years later, FDR and his Executive staff had learned the importance of social networks and personal relationships in building support for policy and were able to succeed to founding the United Nations as a leader and

committed member. Internally and externally, the Roosevelt Administration had positive emotional ties, a moderate level of trust, high information exchange and interaction, and a high number of social networks. These findings indicate that had the FDR Administration not held strong networks and relationships during the United States' decision-making process regarding the United Nations, their efforts would not have been as successful, if at all.

It is important to recognize that there are other causal accounts for the divergence in foreign policy. Generally, scholars have applied the prominent theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism to understand the causes of political phenomena. Furthermore, each of these theories can be used to explain the divergence in United States foreign policy decision-making between the case of the League of Nations and the United Nations. I have not posited that the theory of social networks and personal relationships provides a mono-causal explanation for the political outcomes considered. However, my findings give reason to consider social networks and personal relationships as key factor in these cases, the divergence, and foreign policy decision-making more generally. In this chapter, I will evaluate the theory of social networks and personal relationships in the cases considered and synthesize the theory's contributions with the prominent explanations of realism, institutionalism, and constructivism. I will ultimately contend that my theory builds on the work done on international institutions and foreign policy decision-making. Social networks and personal relationships should be further investigated as a causal explanation of foreign policy decisions and outcomes.

*Assessing the Theory of Social Networks and Personal Relationships*

The case studies I have conducted revealed that the theory of social networks and personal relationships has some value in predicting foreign policy outcomes. The weak social networks and personal relationships of the Wilson Administration limited the support they sought to build and fed the opposition against the United States' commitment to the United Nations. Internally, Wilson did not manage his Executive staff well, excluding them from work on the League of Nations and experiencing personal tension with many of his advisors and statesmen. By not using Secretary of State Lansing, Wilson alienated the Department of State from the planning for the League of Nations and failed to retain support from his very own Secretary of State. Wilson even lost the favor of his once trusted advisor and foreign policy envoy, Colonel House. In general, the Wilson Administration failed to maintain cohesion and strong personal relationships internally, exemplifying division around the League of Nations concept and the Covenant put forward to Congress. It was not merely the personality of Wilson that led to his demise; it was also the relationships and networks within the Administration and between it and the outside world that ultimately influenced the League's rejection.

The theory of social networks and personal relationships also predicts that relationships between foreign policy actors across government and the political arena are important to political outcomes. The Wilson Administration failed to engage social networks and build strong relationships with foreign policy actors in Congress and across the foreign policy world. Wilson himself did not have a great relationship with many Congressmen (in particular, Republicans) and his Administration did not engage in much outreach to Congress before and even during the time the League of Nations was under

construction. Even when Wilson tried to rally support with Senators before he left for his League Tour, he failed to do so to some extent because he had not developed relationships with the Congress to date. Many isolationists opposed Wilson and his Administration and had very little reason, politically and personally, to work with Wilson on the League of Nations. Due to his personal and political convictions, Wilson was not willing to compromise on his plans for the League of Nations and did not engage his network to develop a proposal that would pass. Wilson and his Administration failed to engage key social circles in the broader foreign policy community such as the League to Enforce Peace, the House Inquiry, and other internationalists in tune with key issues in the political arena. The absence of strong social networks and relationships was detrimental to the quest to gain Senate approval and secure United States participation in the League.

Unlike Wilson and his Administration, FDR was seriously committed to developing strong social networks and personal relationships and utilizing them to ensure domestic support of the United Nations. As time passed and the world was again ravaged with war and conflict, FDR and his Administration understood that they would need to learn from Wilson's mistakes and begin planning for the United Nations earlier. In order to fight isolationism and guarantee a global commitment to internationalism, they would garner domestic support and approval for the United Nations by engaging social networks and utilizing personal relationships. Internally, the Roosevelt Administration maintained strong relationships, mainly in terms of information sharing and frequency of interaction. FDR included his advisors and Executive Branch in discussions about the United Nations well before the founding and in fact, tasked them with work on the planning. For

example, the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy was formed well in advance of the formation of the United Nations to begin planning for after the war. Specifically, FDR relied consistently on Sumner Welles' foreign policy expertise and even preserved the relationship after Welles left the Department of State quietly. Although FDR was not always happy with this advisors and staff, he gained their respect with his consideration of their perspectives and utilizations of their skills. Such inclusion ensured internal cohesion.

Consistent with the hypothesis, the Administration had stronger social networks and personal relationships with Congress and the foreign policy community. Notably, the Administration began planning for an international organization and harnessing these networks in the late 1930's. FDR was deeply committed to building relationships and a strong reputation with isolationist Republicans that might be opposed to his internationalist leanings, resulting in partnerships that helped in attaining Senate approval. Later in the process, FDR assigned Secretary Hull to engage with Congress and collaborate with Congressmen and staff on United Nations Charter proposals and policy related to the international organization. Hull and his staff utilized both formal and informal interactions with Congressmen to gain support and approval for the United Nations. Unlike Wilson, FDR and Hull were adamant that congressional leaders from both parties be included in diplomatic conferences and the delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Such engagements emanated from positive emotional ties and trust and continued to develop such factors. More broadly, FDR and his Administration engaged a number of networks as they planned the United Nations, including the Council on Foreign Relations, non-governmental intellectuals and academics involved in advisory

committees, and other relevant foreign policy actors. With information sharing, high interaction, and positive emotional ties, FDR gathered support among foreign policy actors and included them in the planning of the United Nations in order to gain the most important approval of the United States Senate.

*Synthesizing and Assessing Alternative Explanations*

Through a qualitative historical analysis, I have traced the presence or absence of the factors that indicate strong social networks and personal relationships and their impact on foreign policy outcomes. Ultimately, the theory of social networks and personal relationships has been useful in understanding the causal process in each of these cases and their divergence. However, there are other explanations of these political outcomes and the divergence in foreign policy decisions. Realism, institutionalism, and constructivism each can offer alternative theoretical frameworks for understanding this puzzle. In this section, I will briefly review these explanations and discuss how social networks and personal relationships fit within the broader picture of these political phenomena.

Realist theory explains divergence in foreign policy by pointing to national interest and power dynamics. In the cases considered, changes in the international structure and the institutions themselves led to a change in the national value of an international organization. Whereas the League of Nations was seen as weak and antithetical to the United States' pursuit of power, the United Nations was embraced as a tool that might be used to maintain the United States' high place in the global order. Institutional changes such as the addition of a Security Council that gave special privileges to the big powers was an important step in changing the view that such an

organization was not in American's national interest. Whereas isolationists like Henry Cabot Lodge feared the obligatory power of the League of Nations, isolationists in the early 1940's did not believe the United Nations would bring such obligations. While the realist explanation is compelling, it does not account for the causal mechanism by which the institutions and the perspective on internationalist policy changed. Despite similar circumstances, American foreign policy actors ultimately judged the League of Nations and United Nations extremely differently. What, for example, made the United Nations more in the United States' interest than was the League of Nations? From my research, I find that social networks and personal relationships made way for this change, as individuals developed emotional unity, built trust, shared information, and multiplied support for the United Nations.

Institutional theory contends that differences in institutional arrangement and structure can dictate divergences in foreign policy outcomes. Institutional theory would point to the institutions themselves (both the international organizations and the domestic institutions) as reasons for why the United States adopted the foreign policy it did in each case. The institutionalism espoused by Robert Keohane argues that international organizations are adopted by states to lower transaction costs and ensure the accomplishment of their agenda. In this case, the League of Nations did not meet this purpose, while the United Nations did. Again, however, what accounted for this change? Institutionalism might wager that they changed through the reiterative process of diplomatic engagement. While I agree, I believe that networks and relationships at the domestic level shaped these processes. Similarly, Robert Putnam's two-level games theory predicts that domestic institutions shape foreign policy outcomes. More

specifically, foreign policy-makers in the Executive, and the nation-states actions, are limited by the preferences of domestic institutions like Congress. According to this framework, in the case of the League of Nations and the United Nations, the Executive properly understood what the Legislative would approve in one case but not the other. Putnam offers powerful evidence that this is the case. However, I contend that social relationships and social networks play an important role in the Executives ability to monitor and shape domestic preferences and in ensuring the Executive and Legislative branches communicate with one another.

Finally, constructivism proposes that changes in ideology and ideas across time can explain changes in foreign policy outcomes. For constructivists, international institutions and foreign policy stem from the distribution of ideas and the global culture within which a state exists. In the case considered, constructivism would contend that a shift from isolationism to internationalism was a result of an alteration in ideas about international norms, values, and practices. The theory would understand the United States' rejection of the League of Nations as a product of ideology against international obligations and a coordinating organization with such power. After 25 years of discourse and learning, the United States' approached the United Nations with an open mind and a new willingness to accept an ideological commitment to an international organization. While constructivism highlights important changes in ideas, ideologies, and sentiments towards internationalism, I have found that social networks and personal relationships played a large role in that change. Social network theory is often categorized as constructivist. Here, I have fleshed out one mechanism by which constructivism works.

*Conclusion: A Case for Social Networks and Personal Relationships*

I have argued that social networks and personal relationships should be taken seriously as causal variables in foreign policy outcomes, and more importantly, divergences in foreign policy decision-making and important international outcomes. I have consistently recognized that the prominent theoretical frameworks for understanding and explaining international relations and foreign behavior offer important insight into political outcomes. However, to build upon these frameworks and further understand what accounts for foreign policy decision-making, I have investigated how differences in personal relationships and social networks might account for changes in foreign policy. The case studies have confirmed the hypothesis that variance in social networks and relationships explains the United States' diverging position on two similar international organizations, the League of Nations and the United Nations. Had social networks and personal relationships been different in each case, these findings indicate that the result would likely have been different.

Going forward, social networks and personal relationships should be taken more seriously as causal variables in the study of foreign policy and international institutions. In this investigation, I have built on important scholarship put forth by Keck & Sikkink, Slaughter, Kahler and others on networks in international relations. Certainly, the factors that constitute social networks and personal relationships are not the only causal forces in foreign policy and international relations. Still, they appear to make a significant difference in the trajectory taken in foreign policy-making. In reality, government officials and foreign policy actors believe that relationships and networks are important in the work they do and the outcomes they pursue. This investigation has provided evidence

to this way of thinking and calls political scientists and scholars to spend more time researching the impact of relationships on foreign policy, international institutions, and international relations. Foreign policy-makers and the foreign policy community can learn that effective foreign policy-making may require attention to domestic, and even transnational, social networks and relationships.

# Bibliography

*Address of the President of the United States to the Senate. July 10, 1919*. Washington,

   D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919.

"Atlantic Charter." Avalon Project, 14 Aug. 1941. Web.

   <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp>.

"Background of Reaction to Treaty of Versailles." The Great War. The British National

   Archives Learning Curve, Web.

   <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/greatwar/g5/cs2/background.htm

   >.

Bartlett, Ruhl Jacob. *The league to enforce peace*. University of North Carolina Press,

   1944.

Berinsky, Adam J., et al. "Revisiting Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s."*PS:

   Political Science & Politics* 44.03 (2011): 515-520.

Berinsky, Adam J. *In time of war: Understanding American public opinion from World

   War II to Iraq*. University of Chicago Press, 2009.

Berish, Amy. "FDR and Polio." Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum.

   Marist University, Web. <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/aboutfdr/polio.html>.

Berlin, Isaiah. *Personal Impressions*, ed. Henry Hardy. 2nd ed. London: Pimlico, 1998.

Collins, Randall. *The sociology of philosophies*. Harvard University Press, 2009.

Connally, op. cit., p  267, as quoted in Ruth Russell's *A History of the United States

   Charter: The Role of the United States*

Cooper, John Milton. *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight

   for the League of Nations*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,* Vol. II (1948).

Cox, Michael, and Edward Hallett Carr. *The twenty years' crisis, 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

Cross, Rob, et al. "Leading in a Connected World: How Effective Leaders Drive Results Through Networks." *Organizational dynamics* 38.2 (2009): 93-105.

Daniels diary, Oct. 6, 1943. As quoted in Ruth Russell's *A History of the United States Charter: The Role of the United States.*

Davis, Donald E., and Eugene P. Trani. *The first Cold War: the legacy of Woodrow Wilson in US-Soviet relations*. University of Missouri Press, 2002.

"Declaration by the United Nations." A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949. The Avalon Project, 1 Jan. 1942. Web. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade03.asp>.

FDR to Hull. Hull Papers. Nov. 21, 1944.

"First Lady Biography: Edith Wilson." Firstladies.org. National First Ladies' Library and Historic Site, n.d. Web. <http://www.firstladies.org/biographies/firstladies.aspx?biography=29>.

Fullilove, Michael. *Rendezvous with Destiny*. New York: Penguin, 2013.

Gellman, Irwin F. *Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles*. Johns Hopkins Univ Pr, 1995.

Goldberg, Richard Thayer. *The making of Franklin D. Roosevelt: triumph over disability*. National Book Network, 1981.

Goodwin, Doris Kearns. *No Ordinary Time: Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II*. Simon and Schuster, 2013.

Grose, Peter. *Continuing the Inquiry: the Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996*. Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996.

Hewes, James E. "Henry Cabot Lodge and the League of Nations." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* (1970): 245-255.

Hale, Thomas, David Held, and Kevin Young. *Gridlock: why global cooperation is failing when we need it most*. Polity, 2013.

Hermann, Margaret G. "Explaining foreign policy behavior using the personal characteristics of political leaders." *International Studies Quarterly* (1980): 7-46.

Hinton, Harold Boaz. *Cordell Hull: a biography*. Doubleday, Doran, 1942.

"History: From the League of Nations to the United Nations." United Nations Office at Geneva. United Nations, Web. <http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006AC19C/%28httpPages%29/242056AEA671 DEF780256EF30037A2A8?OpenDocument>.

Hodgson, Godfrey. "The establishment." *Foreign Policy* 10 (1973): 3-40.

Hoopes, Townsend, and Douglas Brinkley. *FDR and the Creation of the UN*. Yale University Press, 2000.

Jahn, Gunnar. "Award Ceremony Speech." The Nobel Prize. N.p., 10 Dec. 1945. Web. <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1945/press.html>.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. "The social effects of international institutions on domestic (foreign policy) actors." *Locating the proper authorities: the interaction of domestic and international institutions* (2003): 145-96.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. "Treating international institutions as social environments." *International Studies Quarterly* 45.4 (2001): 487-515.

Johnson to Hiram Johnson, Jr. Johnson Papers. January 22, 1933,

Kahler, Miles, ed. *Networked politics: agency, power, and governance*. Ithaca, NY:

> Cornell University Press, 2009.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in*

> *international politics*. Vol. 6. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.

Keegan, John. "Book Review: 'Paris 1919' by Margaret MacMillan." Washington Post.

> 15 Dec.

> 2002. Web. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

> dyn/content/article/2009/07/08/AR2009070802958.html>.

Kennedy, David M. *Over here: The first world war and American society*. Oxford

> University

> Press, 2004.

Keohane, Robert O. *After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political*

> *economy*. Princeton University Press, 2005.

Kuehl, Warren F. *Keeping the covenant: American internationalists and the League of*

> *Nations, 1920-1939*. No. 10. Kent State University Press, 1997.

Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. *Restructuring world politics:*

> *transnational social movements, networks, and norms*. U of Minnesota Press,

> 2002.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. "The rational design of

> international institutions." *International organization* 55.04 (2001): 761-799.

Lansing, Robert. *The peace negotiations: a personal narrative*. Boston; New York:

> Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921.

Levin, Norman Gordon. *Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference*. Vol. 84.

   Heath, 1972.

Levin, Phyllis Lee. *Edith and Woodrow: The Wilson White House*. Simon and Schuster,

   2002.

MacMillan, Margaret. *Paris 1919: Six months that changed the world*. Random House,

   2007.

Marburg, Theodore. *Development of the League of Nations Idea*. Ed. John Holladay

   Latané. Vol. 2. Macmillan, 1932.

Maruko, Mami. "Envoy Puts Focus on People-to-people Ties." The Japan Times. 4 Dec.

   2012. Web. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2012/12/04/our-

   lives/profiles/envoy-puts-focus-on-people-to-people-ties/#.VR20nJPF-5J>.

Mearsheimer, John J. "The false promise of international institutions. "*International

   security* (1994): 5-49.

Memorandum on Hull. Farely Papers. Oct. 15, 1933.

Mervin, David. "Henry Cabot Lodge and the League of Nations." *Journal of American

   Studies* 4.02 (1971): 201-214.

*Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Constitution Prevails*, 1937

   (1941), pp. 406-11.

Pedersen, Susan. "Back to the League of Nations." *The American historical review* 112.4

   (2007): 1091-1117.

Podolny, Joel M., and Karen L. Page. "Network forms of organization." *Annual review of

   sociology* (1998): 57-76.

Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level

games." *International organization* 42.03 (1988): 427-460.

Robert Lansing Diary, Nov. 12, 1918 in Link, ed. Papers of Wilson, LIII, 65-66.

Robinson, Edgar E. *The Roosevelt Leadership: 1933-1945*. New York: J.B. Lippincott,

    1955.

Rosati, Jerel, and James Scott. *The Politics of United States Foreign*

    *Policy*. Cengage Learning, 2013.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Our foreign policy: a democratic view." *Foreign Affairs* 6.4

    (1928): 573-586.

Roosevelt to Norris.  George W. Norris Papers. September 21, 1943.

Russell, Ruth B. *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States,*

    *1940-1945*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958.

Ryfe, David Michael. "Franklin Roosevelt and the fireside chats." *Journal of*

    *communication* 49.4 (1999): 80-103.

Schlesinger, Stephen C. *Act of creation: The founding of the United Nations*. Basic

    Books, 2009.

Sempa, Francis. "William C. Bullitt: Diplomat and Prophet." American Diplomacy.

    University of North Carolina, Jan. 2003. Web.

    <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_01-

    03/sempa_bullitt/sempa_bullitt.html>.

"Senate Defeats Treaty, Vote 49 to 35; Orders It Returned to the President." New York

    Times 19 Mar. 1920.

    <http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0319.html#article>.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "The real new world order." *Foreign Affairs* (1997): 183-197.

Smith, Gaddis. "Spheres of Influence." Books. New York Times, 25 Jan. 1998. Web.

        <http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/01/25/reviews/980125.25smitht.html>.

Solomon, Robert C., and Fernando Flores. *Building trust: In business, politics,*

        *relationships, and life*. Oxford University Press, 2001.

"Speech by Henry Cabot Lodge to the Senate Opposing League of Nations." Washington

        D.C. 28 Feb. 1919. Web.

        <http://web.mit.edu/21h.102/www/Lodge,%20Opposition%20to%20the%20Leag
ue%20of%20Nations.html>.

Steele, Richard W. "The pulse of the people. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the gauging of

        American public opinion." *Journal of Contemporary History* (1974).

Steiner, Zara. "The League of Nations in Retrospect." (1983).

Strodes, James. *On Dupont Circle: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and the Progressives*

        *Who Shaped Our World*. Counterpoint Press, 2012.

Stuart Mill, John. *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive*. Vol. 1. London: John

        W. Parker, West Strand, 1843.

Taft, William Howard. "Proposal for a League to Enforce Peace: Affirmative, The." *Int'l*

        *Conciliation* 3 (1915).

"The Bullitt Mission to Soviet Russia, 1919." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of

        State, Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/bullitt-mission>.

"The Covenant of the League of Nations." The Versailles Treaty. Avalon Project, 28 June

        1919. Web. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp>.

"The League of Nations, 1920." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Web.

        <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/league>.

"The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles." Office of the Historian. U.S.

   Department of State, Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/paris-

   peace>.

"The Senate and the League of Nations." The United States Senate. Web.

   <http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_item/Versailles.htm>.

"The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941 – October

   1945." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, Oct. 2009. Web.

   <http://2001-   2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/55407.htm>.

Townshend, Charles. "The League of Nations and the United Nations." History – World

   Wars. British Broadcast Corporation, 17 Feb. 2011. Web.

   <http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/league_nations_01.shtml>.

United States. Office of the Historian, Department of State. *Formation of the United*

   *Nations,*

   *1945*. 1945. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un>.

United Nations. Secretary General. *United States, United Nations Need Each Other In*

   *Relationship of 'Productive Interdependence'*. *UN.Org*. 21 Oct. 2003.

U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record,* Sixty-sixth Congress, Second Session.

Uzzi, Brian. "The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic

   performance of organizations: The network effect." *American sociological*

   *review* (1996): 674-698.

Vandenberg, Jr., Arthur H. ed., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (1952).

Vega-Redondo, Fernando. *Complex social networks*. No. 44. Cambridge University

   Press, 2007.

Villiar, Baker papers, Library of Congress, Group 1, notebooks, 8.3.19.

Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of international politics*. Waveland Press, 2010.

Wang, Shirley. "Under the Influence: How the Group Changes What We Think." Wall
    Street Journal. 3 May 2011. Web.
    <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870443600457629896216592533
    64>.

Weinstein, Edwin A. *Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography.
    Supplementary Volume to The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*. Princeton University
    Press, 2014.

Wendt, Alexander. *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge University Press,

1999. "Wilson Embarks on League of Nations Tour–September 3, 1919."American
    President: A Reference Resource. The Miller Center, Web.
    <http://millercenter.org/president/events/09_03>.

"Wilson's Fourteen Points, 1918." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State,
    Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/fourteen-points>.

Wilson statement, March 4, 1919, in Link, ed., Papers of Wilson, LV 408-409.

Wilson to House, March 20, 1918, in Link, ed., *Papers of Wilson* XLVII, 85.

Wilson, Woodrow. "Address delivered at the First Annual Assemblage of the League to
    Enforce Peace: "American Principles"," May 27,
    1916. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65391>.

Wilson, Woodrow. Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41

Wilson, Woodrow. "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points." Washington D.C. 8

Jan. 1918. Avalon Project. Web.

<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp>.

Wimer, Kurt. "Senator Hitchcock and the League of Nations." Nebraska History 44

(1963): 189-204.

Wittkopf, Eugene R.. *Faces of internationalism: Public opinion and American foreign*

*policy*. Duke University Press, 1990.

On my honor, I have not received help on this thesis.

-Schuyler M. Miller